

gion, as Bevin was. They will remain here and we must find a way to reach them. I do not know if we will attain our objective, but we must not aggravate the matter by presenting unnecessary preconditions. Obviously, the question of territory is a fundamental one. There can be no sovereignty and immigration without land. Every child knows that. But we are not setting any preconditions about remaining in the area designated by the resolution of November 29...With faith in the vision of Israel, and in a sincere desire to find a common language with the Arab world, we must prepare ourselves. No one can assure us of success, but we must be prepared for it. We must not create the misleading impression that we are hindering the search for a peaceful solution.

I do not know the thoughts or plans of Count Bernadotte. We respect the U.N., which sent him, and we consequently respect its emissary. However, one must be wary of one's adversary while respecting him. We will make no move which can be interpreted by the world as leading to war. Members of the Government no less than anyone else must do everything they can to strengthen our military capabilities, and we must utilize the truce for this purpose. At the same time, we must engage in sincere, resolute and unwavering efforts towards bringing peace nearer.

The Altalena Incident

Introduction

On 26 May 1948 an agreement had been reached between representatives of the Haganah and the Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL), according to which the latter organization would voluntarily disband "within the frontiers of Israel" and its members join the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which were officially constituted on 31 May 1948. Since Jerusalem had not been formally incorporated into the state, IZL insisted on its right to maintain its independent existence there, and during the first truce brought a ship—Altalena—to Israel, loaded with volunteers and arms. The IZL leadership refused to transfer the ship and its contents unconditionally to the Provisional Government of Israel. This provoked a clash, which brought the young state to the brink of civil war.

Sitting 5 of the Provisional Council of State

23 June 1948 (16 Sivan 5708)
JNF Building, Tel Aviv

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: The Council has been summoned today as a result of the disaster which has befallen us—an attempted assault by the organization known as IZL on the unity, sovereignty, military capabilities and international status of the State of Israel.

The...continuing acts of violence by those groups known as "dissidents" is well known, and there is no reason to dwell on them. With the establishment of the Jewish state we sought to forget the past and enable the whole Yishuv...to open a new chapter of equal participation in the privileges and obligations of building and defending the state.

On May 26 we issued an Ordinance for the establishment of the Israel Defense Forces. This was not a routine Ordinance entailing the establishment of a governmental service, but one of life or death for the Yishuv and the state...Even before the establishment of the state we were maliciously attacked by cruel oppressors; upon the establishment of the state we were subjected to an all-out invasion by the Arab armies...The fourth section of the Ordinance prohibits the establishment and maintenance of any armed force other than the Israel Defense Forces. This...was vital for our self-defense. Only through a unified army...answering to one government and one supreme command can we withstand the external enemy.

The Ordinance and the situation entitled us...to dismantle the armed dissident organizations. We did less than we should have, how-

ever, in order to facilitate their disbanding and create a comfortable atmosphere for their integration into the Army. One organization—Lehi—had already decided to disband, and its members joined the Army without any special negotiations. However, the Zionist Executive, which existed before the establishment of the state and with which IZL had reached an agreement, determined that IZL would not follow Lehi's example. IZL posed conditions for keeping the laws of the state, and violated its assurance to the Zionist Executive that it would disband upon the establishment of the state. The Government did not pursue this formally because it seemed that the major objective—the dissolution of an armed organization and its integration into the IDF—had, for all practical forces, been achieved. The Government made various concessions and, on June 1 this year, the IZL leader signed several guarantees, including the following clauses:

1. The members of Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL) will be conscripted into the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in accordance with the Draft Ordinance of the Government of Israel and will take the standard oath of loyalty.
2. The arms and military equipment currently in the possession of IZL will be handed over to the Supreme Command of the IDF.
3. Of their own volition, IZL and its leadership cease to function and exist as an independent military organization within the State of Israel....
4. Any separate acquisition of arms and military equipment by IZL will stop, and their sources will be given to the IDF, for the benefit of the war effort.

These guarantees were only partially fulfilled. Over 1,000 of IZL's members were conscripted into the Army in special battalions. The undertaking to surrender all arms and military equipment was fulfilled only to a very limited extent. The three major guarantees were not fulfilled at all: IZL did not cease to function, the independent acquisition of arms and military equipment did not stop, and IZL's contacts and sources were not transferred to the IDF.

While the country is still in a state of emergency, during the past three days distressing events have taken place in Kfar Vitkin and Tel Aviv. In violation of the laws of the state and its own guarantees, IZL brought a ship carrying arms to the country. Even if there were no U.N.-imposed truce, this would be a very serious matter, for no country can tolerate the importation of even a small number of weapons by private citizens or organizations without the Government's permission. Large amounts of rifles and machine guns—which IZL admits it has brought into the country—certainly cannot be tolerated.

The importation of weapons by IZL, in violation of the law, the U.N. agreement and its guarantees to the state, is an even greater danger because it places the state in jeopardy and creates a climate of civil war....

When the Ministry of Defense was informed of this, IZL was ordered to surrender the ship to the Government. It refused to do this and posed conditions of its own. Again, the Government did less than it was entitled to...failing to take formal steps to bring about the unconditional surrender of the ship and prevent IZL from unloading the weapons. When IZL refused to do this, my duty to ensure the security of the state and enforce the law was clear, and I knew that this could be done only by force. Nevertheless, I brought the matter before the entire cabinet...and after an exhaustive discussion it was decided that the necessary military forces would be despatched to prevent IZL from unloading the weapons, and to place the ship at the Government's disposal.

I regret to say that some IZL soldiers left their battalions and went to Kfar Vitkin to join the revolt against the Government. This was swiftly quashed, however, and the IZL forces surrendered, handing over their weapons and military equipment and guaranteeing to accept the Government's demands. Alexandroni, our commander on the Central Front, acted wisely and well, performing the task with which he had been charged by the Government with maximum efficiency and minimum casualties....The IZL rebellion by soldiers and civilians in Kfar Vitkin is now over....The ship, which was diverted from Kfar Vitkin after the immigrants had disembarked with the help of local residents, reached Tel Aviv, where it disobeyed the orders of Israeli warships to leave the area and place itself at the disposal of the state....

The cabinet held a special meeting...and decided that if the ship did not place itself and its weapons at the disposal of the Government of Israel, military force would be used against it. IZL refused to do this, and you know the rest. Fire from our cannon hit the ship, which was set alight, and IZL asked the Army to help evacuate the casualties. Our soldiers responded to the request immediately...and the ship is still smoking off the coast of Tel Aviv....

The present incident may have ended, but the danger has not, despite the fact that the Army is strong enough to put down any armed uprising....It is not by military might alone that the evil will be uprooted....The dissidents derive support from various sources, for many reasons. In the past this could be understood, though not justified. At this juncture it is difficult to understand. We are in the midst of a war....Although there is a truce, the war is not over. The Arab armies are within the borders of our country. Jerusalem is surrounded by the Arab Legion and its artillery. The Negev road is held by a large Egyptian force. Mishmar Hayarden has been captured by the Syrian army. The armies of the invaders have entrenched themselves in the country in full force, and powerful forces wait beyond the borders.

The audacity of armed gangs within the country in acting at this moment jeopardizes what may be even more important than the existence of the state itself—the ability of the Jews of this country to defend

themselves for the sake of their own future and that of the nation. This danger will not pass until the inhabitants of the state, and Jews throughout the world, realize the tragic consequences of giving moral and military support to them, as a number of Zionist organizations do....As soon as members of the dissident organizations join the Army they are given the same military equipment as any other soldier....Do not rely solely on the Army, however. The entire nation must eradicate the evil which exists among us....

Rabbi M. Berlin (Mizrahi): ...I have come from the siege of Jerusalem, and was hoping to be able to say something to ease the distress we have been feeling there. I thought that I would be able to speak about what the 100,000 Jews of the capital (for us it is the capital) are feeling and what our thoughts are about the near future....It turns out, however, that I must speak about...what has happened during the past few days...and what we fear may happen....And I speak on behalf of my colleagues, the Ministers of State....

The Chairman said here that...the incident has ended but the danger has not. If the incident were over the danger would no longer exist. I fear that the incident has not ended and the danger still threatens us. We cannot deny...that a rebellion has taken place...and if we approach the issue from this angle alone there is no doubt that the Government has both the right and the obligation to suppress it by force.

Our concern, however, is not with those who rebelled or those who supported them...it is with the consequences the event has for the entire country. Every Jew in the State of Israel (and I include those in Jerusalem) is in turmoil, not only as regards who was right and who was wrong, but as to what position we will be in as a result of this terrible event. In the final analysis, the facts are not only that a ship loaded with arms was brought over, but also that Jews were killed by other Jews...and who knows what will happen in the future....

The newspapers published the Foreign Minister's speech, in which he said—quite rightly—that it was not the truce which led the Government to take the drastic steps it did, but rather the revolt against the "Kingdom of Israel," the Government of the state....These events will influence our political future, and since we are currently in a period of truce, the situation is more serious and the consequences of the revolt more grave. Therefore, our attitude to the revolt must be quite different.

...Without going into what happened at Kfar Vitkin...Jewish blood has been shed by Jews, and a ship carrying immigrants and a cargo which is so essential to us at this stage was burnt. Furthermore, the ship was sunk and people were killed by cannon of the Government of Israel. It has been claimed that the shooting continued after a white flag had been raised....All this cannot help influencing the course of the war....People will say that a government which does not protect itself is weak, and consequently the use of force to suppress...a rebellion is jus-

tified....But this is not all that will be said. People will say that the state is weak and cannot exist. And if this is said about the state, it will also be said about the Government....

Doubt as to whether we can rule ourselves or not...is gnawing at the hearts of all of us....When the first reports reached Jerusalem yesterday...everyone trembled, hoping that the Government would be able to restrain itself—for it is better for the Government to appear weak and the state strong than the reverse....What we must discuss here is not the bloodshed but the danger to the existence of the state....The point is not who is right but that everyone knows that there are two sides within the state....Not even the Prime Minister, in his capacity as Defense Minister, can guarantee what will happen in the coming hours and days. Will we...open tomorrow's papers to find a list of casualties, the victims not of enemies and invaders but of Jews like us? Who knows how long this could continue? The danger to the existence of the state is very grave indeed.

Permit me to say that this is the result of excessive aggressiveness...on the part of the Defense Minister, who has taken upon himself everything concerning the defense of the state....No one...is always in the right when he alone weighs the facts, is responsible, makes demands, decides and implements—afterwards presenting everything as inevitable. No one can set straight what has been distorted, for no one wants to diminish the importance of the Government and its Ministers, especially when the Prime Minister is concerned. Even God Almighty, who gave of His glory to human beings, is said to consult the angels on his actions....But here there are no angels, no other people, there is just one man, and everything goes according to his opinion.

The matter has reached such dimensions that I do not know whether even from the standpoint of the truce things are so simple. We all know that the truce is not quite what we wanted...but the sword was at our throat. People from Jerusalem who are sitting here will tell you that for Jerusalem the truce came at the eleventh hour, when everyone was longing for a respite and needed to store up food and energy. Who knows whether these events will lead to a breach of the truce? Who knows whether countries...will not say that in a situation like this there is no use discussing recognition of the State of Israel? We condemned our enemies, who claimed that Israel was not worthy of recognition because its borders had not yet been determined. Now they can say that ours is a state of internecine strife....Although the Government is aggressive, the state does not deserve that reputation....

...The responsibility which now falls on all those here is...for bloodshed, not for the sake of war, building the land or establishing the state, but bloodshed which calls the viability of the state and the country into question....Can you bear this responsibility?

Certainly, the situation is difficult....A government must say that it is in the right....But do we want to increase the turmoil and the danger, for tomorrow we may once again have to fight the enemy rather than our brethren who are, after all, citizens of our state. The Government must undertake, if only as a compromise, to appoint a Commission. This is no submission or disgrace....On the contrary, this represents the triumph of statesmanship over impulse. The Council should appoint a Commission to study this matter, and we will discuss its findings....Until the Commission is appointed and its findings published...we should announce an internal truce....The prisoners should be freed. They will not be able to run away, and the Government would be displaying its strength. At present it would be better if in New York, London and Lake Success it is said that the Council of State has set up a Commission to review the matter and that we are once again united in our war against the invaders, than that confusion be seen to reign in the State of Israel...thereby broadcasting our vulnerability to our aggressors....

The Mizrahi Ministers, Rabbi Fishman and Mr. Shapira, have asked me to announce their resignation from their responsibilities and to express their desire to have a Commission appointed....Meanwhile, let us declare a truce and the release of prisoners...in order to pour oil on troubled waters, gain some peace of mind and evince a sense of responsibility towards the entire community....

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: I omitted to mention two items. First, the Government will appoint a special investigator to review the list of detainees; any new immigrants among them will be released. The guilt of the rest of the detainees will be investigated. Secondly, the Government will appoint a Ministerial Committee consisting of the Ministers of Defense, Justice and the Interior, which, after undertaking an investigation, will propose an agreement to prevent secession by any dissenting force, non-compliance with the laws of the state and the separate acquisition of arms, and will grant amnesty for crimes committed in these areas.

Z. Lurie (Mapam): I am not convinced that the events of the past two days can be dealt with by means of a Commission of Inquiry, nor do I think that the provocation can be ended by granting amnesty and checking lists of detainees....

Gentlemen...this rebellion has attracted worldwide attention, erupting while we are at war with seven countries, not to mention the intrigues of the British....This was an attempted coup! This is not the beginning, nor is it just another incident. It is the result of an accord between forces which were nurtured by various groups in the Yishuv and the community for a long time....It brings to mind another night in Siwan, fifteen years ago, when Chaim Arlosoroff was murdered. That

was an assault on the sovereignty of the Zionist movement, and today's event was an assault on the sovereignty of the State of Israel!

This is not the time to settle accounts, but what has not been done to justify those who have been nurtured and have risen to the status of equal political partners...Rabbi Berlin? During the past few years all the appeals to Jewish feelings of brotherhood and compassion...have served to pave the way for the incident as a result of which the shores of Tel Aviv are smoking...."Neutral" journalism supposedly preached against civil war but actually paved the way for domination by this group. It was for this that separate weapons and battalions were needed! Rabbi Berlin accused us of having become accustomed to bloodshed...but I ask him—who has been conducting secret trials against members of the Yishuv and ambushing and murdering people for years? Who was it who declared a truce? Who practised self-restraint? Who continually granted amnesty?

Some of those present objected to the agreement....Many within the Yishuv regarded this as simply prolonging the existence of this group in another form, legitimizing it. Very few of its weapons have been handed over, according to the Minister of Defense. Why do they need the rest of their weapons? For the Jerusalem front...? I would like to ask those who justify the agreement even though our very lives are in danger—why were the weapons not handed over immediately...? Why do we need another agreement and why do we need more negotiations...? Why was it necessary to abandon battle positions facing the Iraqi Army and leave the front vulnerable? From whom were they trying to keep the weapons? From our forces! The Government and the Minister of Defense are to be praised for their attack on them and for their firm and just stand...which is supported by the entire nation....

I propose that we adopt the following resolution: The Council of State approves the Government's action against IZL, which has attacked the sovereignty of the State of Israel and the authority of the IDF, violated the agreement and attempted to obtain weapons not for use in the war against the enemy but for encouraging terrorist secession. The reluctance to hand the weapons over to the IDF, which is engaged in a war with a foreign enemy, attests to the fact that they were intended for use in civil war....

The Council of State determines that by its provocation, IZL has destroyed any faith in its readiness to accept the authority and discipline of the IDF. Under the present circumstances it is necessary to confiscate weapons from the IZL, disband its special battalions in the Army and punish all those guilty of undermining the authority of the IDF.

M. Kolodny (Ha'Oved Hatzioni): The Council has to find a way of gaining full Government support for its resolution. If it can be achieved, this unity will have special significance for IZL, showing that the entire Council, Yishuv and nation support the Government, and that

there is no room for independent organizations in the IDF or the State of Israel.

The situation today is not as it was yesterday, when the British ruled the country and when we wanted an agreement to avoid provocations and achieve statehood. I supported the Zionist Executive in its agreement with IZL and I do not regret that. Today we have a state, which implies total, uncompromising sovereignty. On some issues there can be no compromise....There cannot be several armies or any division of authority. This must be clear....It is clear to me that the Yishuv wants an end to the matter and gives the Government its full support.

Rabbi Berlin's announcement of the resignation of the representatives of Mizrahi in the Government worries me because it reveals a split in our unity....We must get used to new concepts in our own state, which we must protect on all sides. I appeal to Mizrahi and its Ministers, and also to Rabbi Berlin, to rethink their position and withdraw their resignation. To Council Member Lurie I would like to say that if one supports the Government one should support all its decisions, not only some of them.

After the address by the Minister of Defense, which made it clear that, despite everything that has happened, we are not interested in fanning the flames, we can declare only that we are interested in strengthening the state. If the Government is prepared to grant amnesty and wants to release certain detainees, it is irresponsible to make aggressive and extremist proposals in the opposite direction. Anyone who is loyal to the Government must support its decisions, and all the members of the Government are bound by them. I truly admire the Government for its patience and readiness to grant amnesty to the rebels, assuming of course that they understand that they must abandon the path they have taken to date.

I do not know what agreements were reached on Jerusalem, but we regard the IDF in Jerusalem as an inseparable part of the army of the state. It is inconceivable that Jewish Jerusalem would tolerate a situation in which the army, for which the state is responsible, consists of various organizations which do not recognize its authority. The international status of Jerusalem has been undermined by others, but the IDF and the state have lived up to their responsibility to the city, and will continue to do so....We will not permit further provocations in Jerusalem. The authority of the state and the army must be upheld in Jerusalem as anywhere else in the state.

Y. Kosoi (Mapam): ...I am not exaggerating when I say that the entire State of Israel, the Jews of the diaspora and our friends and foes all over the world are observing us closely. The future of the young State of Israel, which is fighting for its future, depends to a great extent on the position taken by the Council of State....All those in the Yishuv...who are concerned for the welfare of the state and the Government's ability

to carry out the difficult task with which it has been charged, bless the Government for acting as it did towards those known as IZL....Like myself, many people regard this body as a group of irredentists which only undermines the existence of the Jewish state.

Yesterday I heard the speech given by the commander of IZL in which he boasted...that if he wished he could kill the Prime Minister at any moment. However, he had told his people not to do it. How very kind. How fortunate we are to have such a "hero" in our midst....

I am sure that the entire nation identifies with the Government's position....On behalf of many in the Yishuv, I would like to say that we seek peace, both externally and internally, and that we regard this internal dispute as a tragedy. If this rebellion, which seems bent on undermining our state, continues, however, the workers of Israel will oppose it as firmly as we oppose the external enemy....This should be made perfectly clear....

There can be only one reason for IZL's desire to store arms—to prepare for rebellion, the overthrow of the Government and a coup, following the example of similar movements in other countries....Now they claim that the ship was burnt, and that the weapons could have been in the hands of the Government for use against the external enemy. By what right do they condemn the Government? Should it have given in and accepted IZL's ultimatum? Would this have added to the strength of the Government and our state? It would have made us the laughing stock of the whole world!

...I do not know whether amnesty will be granted or not, nor whether it is necessary at this bitter, terrible period in our lives....But we will not be fooled by tricks and promises. This internal enemy has only one objective: to wait for the right moment and achieve its aim by force, Rabbi Berlin, by shedding Jewish blood, by murder! We all feel that for at least one generation we must preserve our internal unity, in order to fulfill the important tasks of defeating the enemy and building our state. How can we tolerate this hostile internal force, which always carries a sword and brandishes it at us, in our midst? We are at its mercy, for its commander may at any moment give the order to kill or tell his soldiers: "Do not murder, the time has not yet come."...Rabbi Berlin, you would have done well to weigh your words more carefully before saying what you did about this terrible issue....We oppose the murder of Jews and are against courts of execution, but we also oppose a love of the Jewish people which is so extreme that it is willing to jeopardize Israel's fate.

We all regret the fact that blood has been shed, but an order was given by the Government of Israel, and as loyal citizens we must obey it and not rely on the fact that the Government will relent....Rabbi Berlin said that not only was Jewish blood shed but also the blood of the Government. That is correct. The Government certainly did not want this

incident. Yet, had the Government not acted as it did, its blood would certainly have been shed....If a government's blood is shed it cannot fulfill its appointed task. This is the crux of the matter. One may talk of flexibility, but not during a war. I am sure that this action by the Government will strengthen us, proving to the Jews here and in the diaspora that the Government has decided to steer the ship of state through these troubled waters with strength and authority....

...How will the resignations of Rabbi Fishman and Mr. Shapira be interpreted? IZL will say that those Ministers could not countenance the steps taken by the Government. It makes no difference how you explain things afterwards, this is the impression which has been gained. Is this an act of patriotism? Is this how we are to act at this difficult time...? It is quite clear that only if all the groups within the Yishuv stand united that we will be able to subdue IZL. Any rift in the Government clearly increases IZL's strength and impertinence....We must make it clear to the Jewish people that an internal enemy has arisen and that there can be no compromise with it. This enemy is capable of sabotaging the Jewish state by its existence, its war and its attitude....The Council of State must approve the Government's action and make it clear to the nation that this is how the Government will act again if the attempts at rebellion and sabotage recur. Only by action on the part of the Council of State, giving the Government authority and moral validity, will we be able to eliminate this danger....Anyone wishing to condone the action of IZL would do well to imitate the step taken by Mizrahi...at this sitting.

...

B. Weinstein (Revisionists): ...It is typical that this sitting was convened not on the initiative of the Government, whose responsibility it was...but on that of Council Members who felt that this body should make its opinion known....

On June 7 a discussion regarding the ship was held with the representative of the State of Israel in Paris, who invited several Zionist activists and, in the presence of the Haganah representative, asked about the immigrants who would be aboard the Altalena....We may assume that the Government was informed in advance about this "incident." The Government, which is provisional and is answerable to the legislature, should have consulted the Council....Since it has finally summoned the Council and related the events which occurred, let it not use the British euphemism "incident," which was employed in the "statements" issued by the Mandatory Government. Can this frightful phenomenon, the ramifications of which are both physical, psychological and emotional, be called an "incident"?

...I do not accept the claim that the Jews of the state and the diaspora support the Government's action. Do you possess some magnetic instrument which immediately registers public opinion...? This "incid-

ent" caused a crisis in the coalition. The resignation of two Ministers constitutes a cabinet crisis....

Why were we not told of the negotiations between the Government and IZL on the subject of weapons? Is it true that during the first phase of the negotiations a plan to allocate 20 percent of the weapons to Jerusalem was discussed? Is it also true that an agreement was not reached because there were differences of opinion as to what was to be done with the remaining 80 percent? Why were we not told that on Monday a liaison officer sent by the Minister of Defense or the Supreme Command told IZL that the Army would not help unload the arms or provide vehicles for that purpose...? Why were we not told that the order which came from a certain house on Hayarkon Street in Tel Aviv was: "Fire at the people, including those in the water"? We are talking about people who were fleeing a burning ship! Why were we not told, as an indication of public opinion, that even at the Palmah command post at the Ritz Hotel there was considerable unrest because of this...? These are very important facts, which demand investigation. They indicate the mood of the public, the ranks and the Army. Without going into the question of the Government's sovereignty, rights and authority, we must evaluate the Government. The Government's plans and approaches may have been correct, founded upon an authority which we all acknowledge, but its basic assumptions...were flawed, and it is these which we must review.

The Revisionist delegation in this Council has...acknowledged the sovereignty and rights of this Provisional Government, for we sincerely wished to help in nurturing our governmental independence. A Provisional Government, which is appointed on the basis of a resolution passed by a Zionist institution and has not been elected, must be careful in exercising its authority....This is especially true during this period of transition, under these complicated circumstances, when matters are not easily dealt with, and this problem cannot be dealt with in a purely bureaucratic, sovereign and formal way, relying solely on predetermined governmental procedure....

...The Government, or rather the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, has been somewhat over-zealous. His approach is too impulsive. While under pressure one requires lucidity and cool calculation....

The "incident" is not over yet. In the first Jewish city, our temporary capital, shooting has not ceased....Last night our headquarters...were attacked. That building, which is a shelter for refugees and new immigrants, was attacked with grenades and artillery, the phone line was cut and immigrants were taken out of their beds "British-style" and taken away half-dressed. Soldiers armed with Sten guns attacked the printing house where *The Observer* is published, treating the printing workers roughly, in a manner unbecoming a Jewish soldier.

These are ominous signs. If the Government believes that a "reign of Sten guns" will help us solve internal problems and public disputes, and strengthen its sovereignty, it is mistaken. We do not belittle the value of Sten guns when they are aimed at the external enemy. The Government should have ensured that all the people and arms were taken off the ship and should then have taken control of the arms. The Government could have done that. Large quantities of arms cannot easily be hidden....That ship belongs to the Jewish people, not to IZL. If people are still burdened by the legacy of the past, and seek to hinder good relations...by bringing up Arlosoroff's murder, I will have to go back to de Hahn's murder....A responsible government could have dealt with the "incident" easily by taking the step I have just outlined....I do not know if the Minister of Defense made his decision alone. Perhaps he has a group of advisors who advocate a certain doctrine. In the Army there are those who advocate brutality, and they probably proffered this advice.

We demand that a Commission of Inquiry comprising members of this Council be appointed....Everything must be revealed. Witnesses must be called....If the Commission finds that the Government is guilty and the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense made a rash and erroneous decision, then, we regret to say, such a Government, such a Prime Minister, such a Minister of Defense, cannot continue in their positions. Sovereignty does not mean terror. Authority is not arbitrariness. An honest, justified desire to maintain discipline does not mean irresponsibility. IZL, which is accused of having acted illegally, has acknowledged the Government, its authority and its sovereignty....In all its statements IZL refers to our Government and our Prime Minister. IZL is a private organization, not a provisional government, and the level of responsibility we expect from the former is quite different from what we may demand of the latter.

The Foreign Minister should not rely on hints that the weapons were intended for a revolt. It is a tried and trusted method, used by certain governments, to see a conspiracy in every corner....Some people claim that this whole affair concerns the Government's preparations for another act of political submission to the outside....I therefore propose, on behalf of the Revisionist party, that the following resolution be adopted: "The Council of State resolves to appoint a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the circumstances of the bombardment of the weapons ship and the related events."

D. Pinkas (Mizrahi): ...The issue before us is the evaluation of the events of the past few days and the steps taken by the Government. In this respect, the report which we heard from the Prime Minister was incomplete. If the Prime Minister thought...that a putsch was taking place and that swift action was necessary in order to save the State of Israel from the rebels, it may have been possible to understand the nature of the

orders which were given. But I do not think that the Prime Minister believed that anyone who wanted to stage a coup would acquire such a large ship, notify the Government and propose that certain arrangements be made. I am not saying that these proposals should have been accepted or not, but any attempt to justify the Government's actions as a necessary reaction to a putsch is childish....Public reaction to this action is also immaterial, and can be interpreted in various ways....

The agreement reached with IZL by the Zionist Executive has been mentioned here. I know that it was approved by the Jewish Agency, but that was not sufficient. It should have been brought before the highest Zionist institution....I want to know under what circumstances this agreement was reached and on which authority it was made....

There are many other questions to be answered. When did the Government or the IDF learn that the ship was due to arrive? Was this discussed by the Army or the Government...? Were there any negotiations as to where the ship was to anchor...? Was an agreement made by the IDF or the Government to the effect that some of the arms would be designated for IZL troops in Jerusalem? What was the role played by the liaison officer between the people who brought the ship here and the IDF or the Government? What had the Government decided to do with the ship? Why did it demand control of it rather than the ship's withdrawal to avoid violating the truce? Did the Government know...of the preparations which had been made and that the ship had set sail...? Was the Government notified in advance of the fact that the ship was approaching...?

I know that the use of arms within a state is a last resort....Was there no other way for the Government to achieve its goal at Kfar Vitkin? Was it a responsible act to surround the hundreds of people...who wished to unload the ship...? Is it true that IZL was the first to open fire...? If the fact that IZL opened fire justifies returning fire, why was it necessary to employ heavy artillery on the Tel Aviv coast...? According to the reports which I have heard, there were fifty or sixty people on the ship. Was it impossible to subdue this vessel, which was forced to run aground on the shores of Tel Aviv, without employing cannon...?

I am no expert in strategy...but I think that the fact that our Army could come up with no better solution than to use cannon against sixty young men, leading to the destruction of the ship, indicates just how pathetic our Army is....It seems to me to be extremely impetuous and unjustified. If the Prime Minister, as Minister of Defense, is responsible for this, I am very sorry that he must bear the burden of this great error.

The Prime Minister has told us that during yesterday's cabinet meeting it was resolved to demand the ship's surrender....I would like to know how this resolution was conveyed to those concerned....We heard today that several arrests have been made. As a member of this Council, I would like to hear something about the laws of our coun-

try...I asked the Minister of Justice for which crime these people were imprisoned, but received no answer....There must be specific provisions in the law regarding the action to be taken against miscreants of this kind....The Minister of Police told me that neither he nor any of his people were involved in these arrests....

The action of the Mizrahi Ministers in resigning their posts is very responsible, particularly in view of their fervent desire to contribute to the building of the state....Their action indicates the danger and gravity of this situation....I second Rabbi Berlin's request that if the Government cannot give satisfactory answers to the questions posed here, the Council should appoint a Commission of Inquiry....We must investigate every aspect of this serious matter. If we fail to do so, we will not be discharging our public duty satisfactorily....

B. Mintz (Aguda): ...I do not understand the questions raised here, especially by Council Member Pinkas....If he demands a Commission of Inquiry, it should ask those questions, since they are very dangerous, particularly the one about whether the Government violated the truce....I therefore propose that this sitting be declared closed and that nothing said here today be made available for publication....

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: Council Member Mintz has been misled by the question marks Mr. Pinkas appended to his statements. He did not ask questions but rather lectured, with wonderful legality, on matters which are not known even to members of the Government....Some people believe that statements of this kind, whether correct or not, may make matters worse, and that is why Council Member Mintz proposes that the sitting be closed. The Government did not wish to ask for a closed sitting, and at this point I am unable to consult with the Ministers on this. I still do not wish this to be a closed sitting, so as not to give a pretext to whoever is interested in telling all sorts of "sacred" lies, and therefore prefer to have these things said openly. Obviously, one would hope that everyone here was sufficiently responsible, and that Council Members would refrain from making statements which might damage the state.

B. Mintz (Aguda): I am satisfied with what the Chairman has said. I withdraw my proposal and appeal to all the members of the Council and representatives of the press to treat the matter responsibly.

B. Repetor (Mapam): The truce has been in effect for thirteen days, and fifteen days remain....The Council of State should devote the period which remains to preparing our defense, increasing immigration, training the Army, fortifying our economy, augmenting our financial resources and mobilizing all our strength, so that not one hour is wasted.

In addition, the Council of State should deal with the issue of Jerusalem, since for the first time the Council Members from Jerusalem are present and can participate. At the previous sitting the Prime Minister...said that the question of Jerusalem's future and present situation, as well as the preparations for its defense and the continuation of the war must not be postponed. Destiny has decreed, however, that during the remaining days of the truce we must focus on our internal policy....

This being so, let us refrain from dealing with the differences between various parties and the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs. Even I am not pleased with the statements made by the Foreign Minister....At the last Council sitting I raised the issues of the negotiations with the Mediator and the organization of our relations with other countries....There are undoubtedly differences between us...but I would not want these to be tied to the present discussion....Under no circumstances must we blur the weight and significance of the inquiry in which we are now engaged and which demands serious conclusions.

At another time we will examine the Government's policy on the negotiations with Bernadotte, which will determine our political future and sovereignty, the continuation of immigration and the buttressing of our forces....Yet that is not the issue the Council of State has to tackle now. Under discussion is a crucial internal problem which demands that conclusions be drawn and action taken....Any individual and party may criticize the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs, but at the proper time and with responsible awareness of what this entails. What we are dealing with here is an issue which is not new to us....Terrorism and dissent have existed for years....

For me, the unity of the Haganah, Zionist authority and national discipline were essential before the establishment of the state, not only now that there is a Government....Therefore, this debate constitutes the continuation of the one held by the Zionist Executive concerning the agreement with the dissidents. Mr. Pinkas asked the Prime Minister several questions, and I hope that we will receive answers to them, so that we can get to the facts....The agreement reached with the Zionist Executive was based on the disbanding of the dissident organizations as soon as the State of Israel and the Provisional Government were established. The agreement states specifically that arms are the property of the people and that the dissident organizations must not attempt to take control of public life or engage in looting or intimidation....It was agreed that the possession of private arms was prohibited. I would like to know whether an agreement concerning the disbanding of IZL and the halting of all arms acquisitions in this country and abroad was signed by representatives of the Ministry of Defense and IZL. Does not this agreement obligate the dissident organization, or does it have the right to violate it and act contrary to the laws of the state by continuing to dis-

regard Zionist and Yishuv discipline and authority, as it did before the establishment of the state?

The Revisionist representative, Mr. Weinstein, condemned the use of Sten guns by the IDF. If it used them, it was fulfilling its duty to the state and the Yishuv and expressing its loyalty to the Haganah. But what right do those who have used Sten guns against Jews for many years, who have killed members of the Haganah, who have employed intimidation, robbery and murder to act against Jewish independence and the National Institutions, who have disregarded all Zionist and Yishuv discipline, both internally and externally, to ask such questions...? They cannot compare the Palmah with the IZL dissidents. The Palmah is an integral part of the IDF. It is its core and foundation....The Palmah battalions, which lost many men in the battles for and defense of Jerusalem and its foothills, as well as in Galilee and elsewhere, are an integral part of the IDF.

Irrespective of the value of the Palmah and its impact on the IDF, there is a central point which cannot be challenged—arms must be turned over to the people. The Palmah was loyal to the institutions of the Yishuv prior to the establishment of the state as well as during the debate on ways of fighting the White Paper policy. There was a serious debate in the Zionist movement regarding anti-British policies, some sections rejecting physical force, others condoning it. Within the Palmah, too, there were differences of opinion...but everyone submitted to authority and discipline....The Palmah...cannot be compared with groups which violated the law of the state even before it was founded, and who continue with their irresponsible disobedience after the establishment of the state and the Provisional Government. If IZL promised to disarm, why does it need rifles and cannon? What are the bombs for? What was the purpose of the Zionist Executive's resolutions? A military organization whose actions consist entirely of intrigue cannot be trusted. No agreement or negotiation will be useful. There is only one alternative—to disband the organization and hand over the arms.

Council Member Pinkas spoke of giving the ship an ultimatum. I regret the lost arms too. They should have been available for national defense....But why did you not notice the way in which IZL members disarmed Haganah members, Mr. Pinkas? Why did they do that? Why, if not to gain control of one part of Tel Aviv first, with the help of the ship, and then of all of Tel Aviv?

...Do not speak in the name of democracy....Democracy requires the enforcement of the decisions and laws of the democratic institutions. It requires the concentration of the people's weapons in the hands of the people, not in those of gangs who seek to gain control....Mr. Begin's speech implied civil war and a putsch. We have not forgotten the days of terror and murder which existed not long ago, and therefore we cannot accept the approach suggested here. A proposal to distribute arms

on a percentage basis to Jerusalem is unacceptable. Concern for the defense of Jerusalem is not the monopoly of the dissidents. Our concern for Jerusalem may have weakened us on other fronts. The fate of Mishmar Hayarden might have been different had we not transferred two Palmah battalions from Galilee to Jerusalem and Latrun....We do not need an agreement in order to defend Jerusalem. We regard ourselves as brothers of the Jews of Jerusalem under any political circumstances. It is not by irresponsible lawlessness and threats of a civil war that Jerusalem will be defended, and it is not by agreements and the distribution of arms to the dissidents that our independence will be secured. The Ministers and the Chief Rabbis who saw the actions of the Palmah and the Haganah in Jerusalem have no right to acquiesce in lawlessness and sanction banditry....The majority of the population—the 180,000 workers who built the Yishuv, the Haganah and the Jewish state—will submit neither to IZL's takeover nor to the breach of our political independence. It must be clear that there will be no solution through compromise with or acceptance of IZL. We support the Government's action wholeheartedly, as does the majority of the Yishuv and those loyal to the State of Israel....This debate is not related to our political course of action, which we have yet to discuss and decide upon. Compromising with and surrendering to IZL will achieve nothing positive....The Government must take a firm stand in order to fulfill our mission in defense and war, in standing up to political danger, territorial encroachments and external attempts to control us. We must remember the ship and IZL's action and regard it as a grave warning.

A. Katznelson (Mapai): The issue now before the Council is not how to eradicate yesterday's events but how to quash dissent....I am more concerned by what Rabbi Berlin said and what the representatives of Mizrahi did than by the events of yesterday....I realize the importance of what Rabbi Berlin said, although I recall other statements made by that representative of Orthodox Jewry. I well remember his speech concerning the dangers of terrorism at the Yishuv Conference....Rabbi Berlin said something now which has...extremely dangerous implications, namely: "Jewish blood has been shed." Does this mean that Jewish blood must not be shed but that other blood may...? We are living in a state which has both Jewish and non-Jewish citizens. If we were to accept this formula we could accept plunder, robbery and murder....That is a diaspora approach. In our present circumstances no dissent, not even political dissent, should be tolerated. I trust that, following further consideration, the Mizrahi representatives will retract their resignation.

Since the beginning of the truce there has been unending incitement against the Government's policy. The dissidents seem to assume that political programs can be forced upon the Government by terror, as they did with the Jewish Agency and the National Committee....I, too, fear for Jerusalem's destiny and am troubled by rumors of plans for insur-

rection there....If what happened off the Tel Aviv coast had occurred in Jerusalem...in some other form, who knows where it would have led us? As you said, the truce in Jerusalem came at the eleventh hour, and we know what the consequences of a provocation of that kind could mean for the 100,000 Jews of Jerusalem. The Council should discuss this issue rather than the questions posed by Council Member Pinkas....A government representing all the sectors of the Yishuv can investigate whether there is a basis for the claims made here by Mr. Pinkas....

Amnesty has been proposed by the Government....Can more than the proposal of disarmament without penalties (even for the sergeants' hangmen, whose action cost us dear) be expected? Does not opening the doors of the Army to them represent the greatest privilege of all? It seems to me that this is the point which should concern the Council; the Government's proposals are the basis for the elimination...of dissent in the state and...Jerusalem.

E. Wilkomitz (Mapai): This is the second time I have the honor of participating in a Council of State sitting. After the first one I told my friends what a wonderful experience it was when representatives of various parties and currents in the nation and the Yishuv came together...all sharing a common concern for the fate of the Council and the country....

I am sorry that the picture is so different at the second sitting. I have listened attentively to the members who have denounced the Government's actions....I wanted to hear their opinion about the actual issue....What do the members think of the action IZL took in the midst of the turmoil of war? Rabbi Berlin told us that we did not want a truce but the sword was at our throat. It is still there....How should one view a revolt at a time like this...? There is no guarantee that that ship might not have caused...a resurgence of the shooting. How is such an incident dealt with...when a nation is fighting for its life, taking its first independent steps?

Bloodshed, drastic measures and undemocratic behavior have been discussed here. I doubt whether democratic arrangements can and should be demanded at a time like this, on an issue of this kind....The Prime Minister said that before action was taken there was a meeting of the Government in which most of the parties participated. What more was needed? Is it possible in the midst of war to hold full-scale conferences on every step...? Should we wait until the legislature passes the required laws, and meanwhile do nothing to stop people who, according to those responsible for security, are endangering us...?

I do not understand the emphasis some speakers have placed on the provisional nature of the Government. Has someone usurped it and seized the reins of government...? Was there any alternative, under the circumstances in which the state was founded? Can a state establish a permanent government without first establishing a provisional one?

During the negotiations...prior to the meeting of the Zionist Executive, I did not believe that the other side would accept an agreement. Yet I hoped that if the mediators, the party representatives who defended the agreement...were to find that an agreement could not be reached or kept...they would withdraw from mediation.

I find it difficult to understand...the action of a respected party, rooted in tradition, which defended this agreement, claiming that it would save us, now that it has been violated at every step...What is the point of advocating self-restraint at this stage...? As if we have displayed no self-restraint till now! The point is that at any moment the battle may resume, either internally or externally, and the internal battle cannot be prevented by strengthening an organization which acquires and hoards arms for its own use....

Our independent political life did not begin only with the foundation of the State of Israel. It began much before that. We hoped that once we had formal sovereignty as well, dissent and threats of secession would cease. We hoped that our state would be democratic and that a democratic government would discuss issues and make decisions....

If it were not for the support you give it, if that organization were to feel isolated from the public, the ground would be cut away from under its feet. Instead, we hear "there is a cabinet crisis."...Is that all we can tell the nation when the enemy is at the gate? How can we treat the State of Israel and that organization as equals...demanding the appointment of a Commission to determine which of them is in the right?

...Why is it that the moment the cannon fall silent we delude ourselves that the danger has passed...thereby endangering the issue to which we are all committed? We must give our wholehearted support...to all the Government's actions, granting it complete freedom to examine the issue. If the time has come to examine the agreement...or do away with it, we should give it the authority to do so....

Z. Warhaftig (Mizrahi): A few weeks ago we held a meeting in Jerusalem and discussed whether or not to agree to the truce. Understandably...we feared that our opinion would not reach Tel Aviv in time. Nevertheless, we thought that as members of the Council of State, it was our duty to discuss this subject. One of the arguments in favor of the truce was that our enemies...would begin fighting amongst themselves. But we see that the Arabs are taking advantage of the truce to improve relations: Abdullah is going to Farouk, and Ibn Saud is meeting with Abdullah....Thus, when the truce ends they will be able to attack us in concert. In our camp, however, the old dispute and rift which is so dangerous for us has been revived....We in Jerusalem feel the danger of that rift, perhaps more than others....

The essential question is how to eradicate the underground....From the postwar experience of many countries in which underground movements existed we know that they were not dissolved within a brief

span. It sometimes takes a year or two before an underground movement is eradicated and absorbed into the regular army. Yet, in our impatience we are trying to dissolve an underground movement within a few weeks.

We have had, and will still have, much trouble from the elements which were in the underground, but more patience is needed.... Anyone who assesses the situation since the Zionist Executive meeting must admit that the agreement reached there was a great achievement.... It is a fact that throughout the fighting matters were smoothed over and the dissidents fought alongside us. The Jerusalem District Commander even noted their valor in certain battles. But Jerusalem suffered greatly from the failure of those organizations to become an integral part of the Army. If we are encountering such behavior during the truce, I believe that more patience and less impetuosity is needed....

I do not share the fear of this armed force. History has taught us that an armed minority need not be feared when the majority is also armed, and more adequately.... IZL suffered a defeat this week, and that may teach it a lesson. The question is, how to prevent this rift becoming wider and the bloodshed continuing? We do not always have to act with all the severity of the law.... I do not think there is such a large gap between the various proposals, provided we do not act impulsively and try to exercise self-restraint....

We propose that the Council appoint a Commission of Inquiry and that the arrests be reviewed. The Government says it will grant amnesty, and I see no great difference between an appeal for release and amnesty. As long as there is no legal basis for arrests I see no reason not to release the prisoners.... If we accept both proposals we can bring peace to our camp, something which is extremely necessary in order to prepare for the major battle ahead. I suggest appointing a smaller committee of two or three members, which will be responsible for formulating a proposal. In my view, what is most important is that the Council of State reach a unanimous decision. That would be the greatest contribution of all to bringing us tranquillity and enhancing our young country's prestige, both internally and externally.

E. Berligne (General Zionists): Ever since the Jewish Agency brought the question of an agreement with IZL before us, and until the resolution was adopted, I was in favor of the agreement, and remain so now. ... Those who objected to the agreement maintained that when the time was right the other side would violate its commitment. I think it was a mistake on our part to postpone the agreements for months after the Jewish Agency had made the decision in principle. It enabled the dissident organizations to commit abominable crimes (murdering soldiers in their beds, bombing houses, hanging the sergeants, etc.), and... over time these organizations have become used to doing as they please....

IZL did not begin its operations yesterday.... Everyone knew that these were being carried out in opposition to the future Government... the Jewish Agency and the National Committee. The question was, since these institutions could not force the dissident groups to stop these actions and accept their authority, what hope did a handful of Jews in Israel have of enforcing law and order in the state they were demanding? The enemy hoped that the dissidents would cause the downfall of the future state.... The tragic step which the Government was obliged to take will prove to friends and foes alike that the Government is by no means weak....

Questions have been asked regarding the details of the agreement, which took a long time to work out in the Jewish Agency and the National Committee.... But without the postponement the agreement would not have been reached....

The Government has two options. One is revenge, as was the case in Russia, where, when members of the opposition were caught, there was no recourse to the due process of law.... The other option is to use the law of the land to punish the dissidents.... The Government has not proposed complete amnesty... but people have been imprisoned and we must ask the Government to grant them clemency.

I would like to ask my friends from Mizrahi... whether they are fully aware of their responsibilities and whether they think that it is necessary to take a step which could bring about the collapse of the Government, and consequently the state? For there is no difference here between the Government and the state.... For various reasons Members of the Government have seen fit to resign in the past, thinking that by doing so they would correct the situation. We all know that that is not the way, and a resolution was adopted to the effect that resignations would not be accepted. I suggest that we appeal to the Council Members not to accept these resignations....

M. Wilner (Communists): ... Our duty today is not to evaluate the Provisional Government's actions but rather to ascertain whether... there is one Defense Force in Israel or different armies in various forms.... I am not prepared to go into the details of the questions Mr. Pinkas asked. They do not alter the essence of the decision the Council must make, namely, whether IZL is to be permitted or banned.... If it is banned, the logical conclusion... is that the acquisition of arms for it... is also banned. This is not merely a formal question, since there is... special validity to the agreement of all the members here that there should be one Israeli Army.... There is an additional problem here, however. IZL did not disband itself but declared that it would continue to exist in different parts of the country as an independent military organization.... The question—what are these arms for—may well be the crucial one.

It seems to me that at the moment the problem is not a military revolt, though there is no doubt that this was a step in that direction.... We know that before non-democratic movements gain control...they are very democratic, opposing capitalism, imperialism, etc., and advocating a new type of democracy, a "new order." Now we know the true character of that new order. If there is no intent to carry out an armed revolt, against the will of the majority, there is no reason to accumulate arms....I am not prepared to justify every detail of every step taken by every commander. I do not know exactly what happened. But that does not alter the central issue confronting the Council of State.

The problem is that a certain group in the Yishuv did not achieve a putsch simply because it did not have enough arms and support for it. ...The Yishuv must solve its political, sociological and class problems in a democratic, political struggle for public opinion, winning public support in the manner each party finds appropriate.

I do not agree with those Council Members who claim that in an emergency there is no room for democracy....I justify objecting to the acquisition of arms by IZL, not because democracy is impossible now but precisely in the name of democracy....The road to hell is paved with good intentions. I do not know these people personally, let us assume that at times their intentions are good, but if this matter is permitted to follow its present course much more blood will be shed in order to defend democracy. I do not think that this issue concerns solely the workers and the Histadrut, as many speakers have implied. Every democratic Jew of every class should defend democracy and independence, and not permit people to march on Tel Aviv, Jerusalem or anywhere else in the State of Israel. It is true that the Government...should be criticized for asserting its authority only internally and not externally. I hope that there will be a political debate and that this will be discussed.

A foreign power—America—is penetrating the country under our very noses, and our sovereignty is being undermined. But this does mean that the Government is relinquishing internal sovereignty....It is not at all certain that that Power...will consider the IZL's putsch as something counter to its objectives....Yesterday's event, its reception...its tone and its leader aroused unpleasant memories for the Jewish people. We must determine our basic policy and act accordingly. As soon as the Government asserts its authority externally as well as internally one of the most important propaganda measures employed by the underground organization upon the youth and various sectors of the Yishuv will vanish, and the underground organization will no longer be able to present itself in contrast to the Government as the defender of the sovereignty of the state and the nation. The Government must make no concessions where the State of Israel's external or internal sovereignty is concerned.

The Foreign Minister, M. Shertok: ...The phrase "a Jewish state" has been a magical one for us for many years. But the emphasis has always been on the second word, state. It is not enough that the entity we have founded is Jewish. If it does not become a state it will neither exist nor be Jewish. This state is still fighting for the right to be Jewish....Yet, if it does not reach statehood in the process of this struggle...we will be defeated and fail to achieve our goals. When I listened to my dear and honored friend, Rabbi Berlin, I realized that he is not concerned with the issue of the state. He is still hovering above us in the abstract world of Jewish unity and fraternity. Of course, all that is very desirable, but we are fighting for the existence of the state, and if we are defeated everything is lost....For me, the distinction between state and Government, and the assertion that a government may be weak as long as the state itself is strong, is academic....How can a strong state exist on the foundation of a weak government? What value does this Council have if the laws we pass are not enforced, and a minority which disagrees with something can resort to the use of force while we may not? What value does this Council and this Government have?

The Provisional Government decided to accept the truce, and the Council of State approved this. The arms shipment...would have constituted a breach of the truce. Let us assume that there is political justification for violating the truce. Who is to determine that? Is it to be the Government...or will it submit to the dissident force in order to prevent an increase in the number of casualties? Let us assume that the Arabs would have treated that violation with benevolence and would not immediately have opened fire on all fronts....We would not have been indifferent....Although the violation of the truce was important, it was not the most significant element of this issue. What was more significant was the violation of the state's sovereignty and authority....The truce cannot be violated by anarchic behavior or by a partisan action....Decisions of that kind must be made by authorized persons in appropriate places. Therefore, the conclusion is not as Rabbi Berlin suggested. These phenomena must not be met with selfrestraint. We are not at the beginning of the road. An agreement was reached, and the minority which objected to it must accept the verdict of the majority. It was implemented to the extent that matters depended on us, but it was still violated. The agreement stated that the acquisition of arms would stop, but it did not. It also said that IZL's weapons would be handed over to the Government, but they were not....Now unspecified sources inform us that the person who calls himself the leader of IZL has abrogated the agreement. IZL does not recognize the Government and is removing its men from the IDF....This announcement was unnecessary since the agreement was revoked when it was violated publicly....

As a member of the Government, I would like to say that the general assumption that these issues were determined by a single Minister was

insulting....A special cabinet meeting was called by the Minister of Defense, and before that no action was taken....At the meeting the Government decided what steps were to be taken. There was a discussion, and a consensus was reached on policy lines and their implementation. The public was informed and action began. The order which was issued derived from the Provisional Government's decision....

The next day the Government decided on a line of action regarding the ship, and appropriate measures were taken. Mr. Weinstein can make only a futile attempt to conceal irrefutable facts by resorting to false propaganda. IZL's forces tried to capture a section of the coast...then made a frenzied and irrational attempt to disarm members of the Haganah in Tel Aviv. Firing began when there was no choice. Mr. Weinstein forgot to tell us about that. Why did IZL refuse to turn over the ship and the weapons to the Government? Was this justified? How can a member of the Council of State justify this...?

I would like to tell my friends in Mizrahi, who seem to be living in the past, that resigning from the Government is not like resigning from the Zionist Executive. The Jewish Agency's Executive could be upset by resignations and the consequent disruption of the coalition much more easily than the Government's. There must be a Government. The existence of the Zionist Executive is not imperative. There will be no anarchy in this state. The Government will continue to exist. I was very upset at this step and did my best to prevent it. I will be very upset if they insist on carrying out their decision....They will be harming themselves more than the Government.

Mr. Weinstein has claimed that this is "only" a provisional government. In relation to whom is it provisional? In relation to the public which established it...? Does this not weaken the Government's authority? Should it make concessions in its sovereignty because it is provisional? They told us that when the state was established they would submit to its authority. Now they say that there have been no elections, therefore they are not obliged to obey the Government. I will not tax my mind with trying to guess the excuses Mr. Weinstein will find for IZL's breaches of discipline after a government is established by elections....I condemn this false patriotism. I would like to tell the members of Mr. Weinstein's faction that there can be no compromise between observing the law and violating it within the legal context of the State of Israel. If there is any justification for our sitting here, it is that we make laws through a process of deliberation and decision-making, which is followed by obedience to those laws. Anyone who demands the right to participate in the deliberations and decision-making and subsequently assumes the freedom to tell others to violate these laws severs himself from the legal context of the state. The choice is between renouncing or fulfilling our duty to ourselves. Our state will be based on the fulfillment, not the denial, of duties.

Y. Rubin (Hatzohar): The Foreign Minister has said that the establishment of the State of Israel requires us all to preserve it as a state in general, and as a Jewish entity in particular. That has serious implications as far as the changes in our life are concerned. We have begun adapting ourselves to the framework of public life, following the example of other nations....

We all agree that the Government must have authority. A state has no validity if its citizens do not obey its Government's authority. The question is how to impose authority....Considering the brief term of our Government's existence, I doubt whether the measures employed to impose authority on a group of people who supposedly attempted to disobey it were justified....I would really like to hear answers to the questions which have been asked. Do any of the Council Members honestly believe that it is possible, in the few weeks since the proclamation of our independence, to acquire such a large amount of weapons? Did the Government really not know that the ship had set sail...?

It has been said here that the clauses of the additional agreement signed on June 1 obligated IZL to hand over its weapons and transfer its men to the IDF. I would like to ask whether a transfer so recently initiated can be completed in a day or two. Was there an attempt to delay its implementation until the ship's arrival? Is there no significance in the fact that on the eve of the ship's arrival the process of IZL's integration into the IDF was delayed? Questions have been asked, but we have not received any answers....

Is it not strange that a cache of weapons, whose future use was apparently so clear, was sent to Kfar Vitkin? Does this not arouse the Members' suspicions? Was this perhaps prearranged...? I repeat, was it not possible to enforce the Government's authority by alternative measures, before resorting to force...? Each of us here—and that is why we are here—recognizes the Government's authority and its fundamental right to any arms reaching the country, but we believe that in the present situation it is impossible to act solely according to the letter of the law....

If the Government managed to impose the surrender and disarming of those who reached Kfar Vitkin, it could have done the same in Tel Aviv....It is a basic error to think that a show of force indicates strength. A true state, a strong Government, displays patience. It knows how to forgive, with certain limitations, of course, but it can also take control when there is no alternative....This state cannot be treated like any other. We are building it. Its citizens have yet to reach it. We are tied to world public opinion....What impression will be made if, in our first steps, one Jew treats another in this fashion?

Y. Kosoi (Mapam): Why don't you ask IZL that?

Y. Rubin (Hatzohar): I will....To what extent were all the options to prevent this disaster fully exhausted...? We are here not only to review one

another's actions, but to discuss how to prevent ourselves from falling into the abyss where our enemies would like to see us....

I would like to use this platform to appeal to the Government and the Council Members to prevent matters from taking the ominous trend we are currently witnessing....I propose that the Council resolve to stop all actions whose intentions are similar to those of the operation on the Tel Aviv coast.

B. Idelson (Mapai): It seems to me that during the past three days...we have realized how ignorant we are as citizens of the burdens we carry. We have experienced months...of war with several neighboring countries supported by foreign aid, while we had no weapons, no authority, nor the necessary means with which to protect ourselves. Many of us are still in mourning. Some families still do not know where their sons are.

This event occurred at a time when we were to have a breathing space, a few days in which to consider defense and our political situation. I was surprised to hear demands made here...for self-restraint and loyalty....Where was your self-restraint? What did you do to influence that group and prevent the disaster in Tel Aviv and Kfar Vitkin...?

Some people have tried to blame the Provisional Government....If those members realized the direction in which matters were developing and feared disaster, why did they not react...? How can you present this issue with the Government on one side and IZL on the other? Can you not see that a comparison of this kind is invalid? We are attempting to adopt a state format, to form a Government which will act within the confines of a constitution. We all hope that this constitution will be progressive, and there will be no need for detentions and the use of arms. However, you who demand loyalty, democracy and compassion from one side...why did you not tell that group...that there is a ruling body which must be obeyed, and that we all participate in the Council of State and therefore share in the running of the country...?

Resigning from the Government is too great a luxury. I am surprised at parties which have been in the Zionist Organization for decades and are part of this young Government, not because they identify with the perpetrators of the deed or approve of that group's refusal to surrender, but because of their compassion and good intentions....We are at war. Our sons are serving in an army controlled by this Government. Our sons in the Army need weapons. No one else...has any right to possess weapons in this country. The Government is conducting this war, and is responsible for our sons' lives....We must realize that the Government was compelled to act as it did as a result of... the irresponsible actions of others....

N. Nir-Rafalkes (Mapam): ...I understood from the Chairman that the Government was notified about the ship on Saturday....Why, then, was the Council of State not convened on Sunday morning so that it could authorize this action...?

Rabbi Berlin was right in saying that the state could not exist in this manner. Mr. Warhaftig was also right in saying that whereas we thought that during the truce there would be civil war among the Arabs, in the meantime it is we who are experiencing internal conflicts....But these complaints should be addressed to IZL....No party has spoken of the cause of the matter....All we hear is Council Member Pinkas, who has asked questions, as a good lawyer should. But there has been no trial. First, what happened must be defined, not defended....The question still remains, why were the weapons not turned over to the Government...? Council Member Weinstein told us: "The ship and the weapons belong to the people." When the people's representatives came to claim the weapons and the ship, they were denied them....The ship brought five hundred tons of arms. I would like to know who they were for. If they were for IZL then they were to be used against us, against the same people Mr. Weinstein claims own them. I will not quote that speech at length, but, like me, you have all read it: "I call on my brethren in IZL not to open fire. I order you to bear arms....To each his weapon, in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and anywhere else. But we will not open fire. There will be no civil war while the enemy is at the gate. However, if they raise a finger against anyone of us, their fate is sealed." Why are you not discussing this? Why are you directing your complaints against the Government?

I do not always agree with the Government, especially on defense issues...but at this point I will not draw any conclusions....At a time when we are confronting the enemy we are told that it is impossible to act solely according to the letter of the law....What does this mean? The existence of the IDF is a law. Does this mean that the IDF is the letter of the law and IZL is the spirit of the law...? We are told that we must adapt to the law. For decades we have been living under the rule of law. We are a civilized nation, familiar with the essence of law. You have approved these laws as well....I do not understand why you participate in this Council of State, which is supposed to exist in conjunction with the Government, while defending those who violate the law....The violation of the truce and the retention of arms by IZL benefits the Arabs and the British. If there is civil war, the Arabs and the British will gain. That is why I consider those interested in a civil war among us as being Arab and British agents....

A Commission of Inquiry is proposed and we are told: "Jews are killing one another." That is true. Murder is a very evil thing...but if women and children are killed at Dir Yassin—that is murder too. Why did we not hear your voices then...? We must not revive the three years

of the IZL episode, when all its operations, starting with the bombing of the Refinery, benefited imperialism and the British....What will the proposed Commission of Inquiry investigate? The Government's actions in suppressing the revolt...? No civilized nation would accept a demand of this kind....

I am a man of compromise. I am prepared to accept the amnesty and disregard the rest provided someone guarantees that the matter has ended....Council Member Warhaftig assures us that they will turn the weapons over to the IDF. If Begin had said that I would be certain the promise would be kept. Although I believe Mr. Warhaftig, he does not have the authority to keep that promise....We must not grant amnesty irresponsibly. A special investigation is necessary to release the innocent, but those who are guilty must be treated with all the severity of the law.

A. Stop (General Zionists): ...The mere fact that a few weeks after the establishment of the Government and the Council we are attending a sitting with this incident on the agenda is very upsetting....When this Government was founded we hoped that it would be supported by the entire nation....Although still young, this Government is ours....The one domain over which the Government has exclusive control is the Army and its weapons....We do not think there can be any doubt that it is essential that the Government retain that exclusive right....

We consider the event of yesterday a great disaster....We are not convinced that the Government exhausted every possibility of preventing bloodshed....We demand that measures be avoided which can be interpreted as indicating the Government's weakness....We are in the midst of a war and need a strong Government, and will therefore refrain from making proposals which may imply Governmental weakness. We must avoid measures liable to cause sections of the Yishuv...to go underground again....Therefore, we will support the Government's proposal to appoint a committee and put an end to this for once and for all....We cannot fight both an external enemy and an internal underground movement....We must endeavor to mobilize all our resources in order to create a climate conducive to nationwide support for the Government. We must be prepared for the difficult situations ahead....

The Minister of Immigration and Health, M. Shapira: I do not suffer from the resignation syndrome. For thirteen years I have been, and still am, a member of the Zionist Executive, and my fellow-members will testify that I have never resigned. If I have reached this point...it means that something quite unusual has happened. What we feared and tried to prevent all along has come to pass. We are on the brink of civil war. I admit that I am one of the initiators of the agreement with IZL. I do not sympathize with that movement. I despise any form of dictator-

ship....I invested efforts in bringing about this agreement for one reason only: to rid us of this dangerous disease. I consider dissent to be a very dangerous disease in the body of the Yishuv. I have felt all along, and still do, that the only cure for this disease is leniency rather than heavy-handedness. I fully believe that by personal contact we can overcome hatred among brothers. I knew that IZL was not an easy partner for negotiation, being characterized by stubbornness. Although I knew this in advance, I chose that approach because I saw no viable alternative. The question is, were the events of the past few days inevitable? I believe that the disaster could have been prevented. When the state was established IZL announced that it would disband, with certain agreed concessions....It is true that it failed the first test....But was the approach we adopted the only feasible one? I was unable to participate in the first Government meeting to deliberate this issue. When I returned from Jerusalem and discovered what had happened I gathered a few colleagues together and Rabbi Fishman discussed the situation with Ben-Gurion....The result of this was an urgent Government meeting the following day....In order to prevent the disaster, we suggested a twenty-four hour truce...but this was rejected.

...The simplest solution would have been to let the ship sail from our shores....

The Foreign Minister, M. Shertok: How do you know that it would have sailed?

M. Bentov (Mapam): It ran aground on a sand bar and could not sail.

The Minister of Immigration and Health, J. Shapira: They claim that they were prevented from sailing. That is a serious claim and should be examined. The agreement did not entitle us to unload the ship by force....Only someone who thinks that this was not the case can justify what happened....I agree that IZL acted inappropriately, but it did not intend to use those weapons against the Jewish Government and the State of Israel. It is not insane. Consequently, it is a disaster that these arms were lost. In the meantime there have also been arrests...which have become a political issue. We did not imagine that there would be detentions without a Government decision, especially since this matter was discussed in a Government forum. We think that if detentions were necessary, the issue should have been brought before the Government for debate....At the Government meeting which was held at approximately the same time as the Council sitting we proposed releasing the prisoners in order to calm matters. Only part of that proposal—that immigrants and anyone caught unarmed be released—was accepted....I am sure that the recent events caused many members to fear for the existence of the state, but order cannot always be achieved by force....Illegal immigration was a violation of British law and order...and we were very distressed when Jewish immigrants were

shot and killed. I know that some people will say that there can be no comparison between the two situations, but I think there can....I am not convinced that those arms were intended for use against the state....The acquisition of arms is not enough. If we do not know how and when to use weapons, they could destroy the state that we are in the process of building....

Our resignation is not intended to weaken the Government. We realize that the enemy is at our gate, and internal matters are not getting any easier either....Our resignation is intended to stress the gravity of the situation....Now, after IZL's last statement, if it fails to acknowledge the law, we will have to organize camps in which to keep its members instead of mobilizing all our resources to fight our external enemies....I think that it is the duty of the Council and the Government to make every effort to prevent bloodshed and internecine war which may annihilate the state in its infancy....I hope that a way will be found to bring peace to the Yishuv, so that we may strengthen ourselves against those outside who hate us.

M. Grabowsky (Mapai): ...There is no guarantee that had the Government given in yesterday IZL would not have taken the next step; it was counting on our not being bold enough to use force, while they dared to open fire. It was certain that the Government would relent this time too. What would Mr. Shapira and other Council Members have said had a different group...acquired arms, brought them here and demanded to be negotiated with...? We heard on the radio yesterday (and I heard the whole speech) that this Government is regarded as a group of traitors who went to Rhodes to sell the people out. This constitutes incitement to an assault on the Government....Rathenau was assassinated for similar reasons. If our Government had not acted as it did, it would have lost its basis. I agree that that was one of the most critical moments in our existence as a Jewish state. An image of the destruction of the Second Temple has haunted me the past few years. I read those ghastly episodes and try to discover why they destroyed themselves from within. Then, too, there were warring groups and sects....We also have a sect which regards itself as having a monopoly on courage and patriotism. As far as it is concerned everyone else is a traitor.

...How can you believe that this issue will resolve itself...? Who can be sure that if the ship had withdrawn the weapons would have been returned to the Jews? Who can promise that the weapons would have been given to us in a week or two? Why should they have been given to the IZL battalions? Can we be sure that they would not have been used to dictate certain conditions to us...? Loyalty...is determined in testing times, not by legal or political means....Yesterday was a terrible testing time; the Government passed the test and deserves our full support.

I. Ben-Zvi (Mapai): ...We all regret what happened. Besieged Jerusalem cannot have been encouraged by the incident. It occurred in Tel Aviv but it could have happened in Jerusalem, in which case...the situation would have been much worse. The operation was carried out decisively and competently. I doubt whether this would have been the case in Jerusalem....The issue of the weapons is mentioned constantly, but there is one simple fact which cannot be ignored. If those weapons were intended for the benefit of the state and the war, they should have been turned over to the Government immediately, but they were not....There were negotiations. There were promises. But the crucial fact remains that the weapons were not surrendered....If this body is to be a genuine Council of State, it should reach a decision instead of arguing....

The Government has proposed, most magnanimously...that we release the immigrants and those caught without arms and appoint a Ministerial Committee....I endorse this proposal because at the moment we have defeated IZL and taught it a lesson. We have triumphed. At a different time and place matters could have turned out differently....Due to the Government's forceful action it is now in a position to grant amnesty....

I would like to tell Mizrahi...that I realize that a great effort was made to resolve the IZL issue by means of an agreement with the Zionist Executive and the institutions of the Yishuv. I favored the agreement, though was not pleased with some of its clauses....I saw all the risks the agreement entailed, but considered it a starting point. I do not think it was a mistake. Now, however, the issue is no longer theoretical....A debate was held and Mizrahi submitted its proposals, as is its right. There was a decision, however, which must be upheld....You have many friends in the Haganah. What will you say to them? You support this State. You were among its founders. You have no right to resign....Those responsible for the foundation of the state—and you share that privilege—were aware of the underground and its dangers, including the probability of a civil war. They realized, however, that the responsibility of the state and the Government are one....Consequently, I propose that we refuse...to accept the resignations and demand that Mizrahi occupy the positions it was assigned by the founders of the state....This Council proclaimed the independence of the state and is directly responsible for the existence of both the state and the Government.

The Minister of Welfare, Rabbi Y. Levin: ...This is a terrible war between brothers for which there is no easy solution. It has been going on for several years and has caused much anguish. Those who caused it may have good intentions, but nonetheless their actions are unacceptable. I would like to support the proposal made by Mr. Warhaftig and

others, namely...that the Council of State reach a unanimous decision....I second the proposal to appoint a subcommittee to formulate a decision which will be accepted by the entire Council at tomorrow's sitting.

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: I began my speech with the great disaster which has befallen us. I continue with an even greater disaster, the one which was averted yesterday. The disaster which occurred can be remedied. The Government's forceful actions limited the damage...by preventing five thousand rifles and two hundred and fifty machine guns from reaching a terrorist gang. Had this not been done, the terrorists would have been capable of destroying the Jewish state and the Yishuv's freedom....

The Mizrahi representatives resigned from the Government today, when their proposal to release all the people imprisoned was rejected, although it was decided that we would release the innocent and those caught without weapons....Despite their good intentions, the action of Rabbi Fishman and Mr. Shapira has objective political significance, implying identification with IZL....IZL itself was never very dangerous. A terrorist gang cannot endanger a healthy Yishuv and nation. Nevertheless, there was always the danger that it would acquire tacit support, not because of its attitude to the Mandatory Government but rather for internal reasons which have nothing to do with the overt objectives of terror. If IZL had not known that such support existed, it would not have dared to act as it did. What Mizrahi did today, although well-intentioned, reinforced IZL....

We all mean well, therefore we will not judge each other. History will be our judge....Those who are so concerned with IZL should reassess their positions, considering the Yishuv, the state and their friends in the Government, and not dismissing them so lightly....Rabbi Berlin claimed that war and defense affairs are determined by a single person. He did not follow my opening speech closely. What I said regarding the action against IZL was exactly the opposite. I said that compromises and concessions...are my responsibility. I approved them because the Zionist Executive had reached an agreement with IZL. I considered this to be a dangerous mistake, but the Zionist Executive's decisions are binding upon us all, and must be implemented....The Zionist Executive felt that the agreement would avert the disaster known as secession, and that we should help IZL members repent if they so desired. I disagreed with this. But it was the decision of the majority, and I respected it....

When the time came to take action against IZL I did not act on my own, although I had the legal authority to do so. Realizing the gravity of the step, I did not want the question of authority to divert us from the actual issue. I submitted the subject to the Government, which deliberated and reached a decision. I acted in accordance with that decision, and

although I do not shrink from responsibility, I wanted to share the responsibility for ordering the Army to act. Representatives of the Army participated in the Cabinet meeting....Questions were asked and a unanimous decision was reached, upon which the Army acted....It could have annihilated the gang, but it did not. Realizing that the goal was to prevent the crime, not execute the people, the Army attacked in a manner which forced IZL to surrender....I deny the allegation that people were fired upon in the sea....On the contrary, people asked Palmah members who were on the shore to help them. They did this, despite being fired upon by IZL, resulting in the deaths of two of them, and although the ship could have exploded at any moment.

I refuse to subject myself to cross-examination by Begin or anyone else....Mr. Weinstein wanted to know when the Government heard about the ship. I was informed by a special messenger...on Saturday. He told me that IZL had announced that a ship loaded with arms would be arriving and that they needed assistance in unloading it. IZL was told to turn the ship over to the Government, but refused to do so. That was the subject discussed, Mr. Pinkas. There was no agreement that IZL would be given part of the weapons for Jerusalem or anywhere else. The Government insisted that the ship and the weapons be turned over to it. IZL refused to do this....It was the Government's responsibility to use any means to get hold of those arms. The Government is responsible for the security of the country, and therefore cannot permit individuals to possess arms....

Mr. Pinkas asked many questions in Begin's name. IZL's "leader" may be a very important person, an ardent patriot, a great fighter and a brilliant commander, and it may be a great honor to speak in his name, but I do not owe him any answers, even if the questions are asked by surrogates. I must relate to matters which concern the Council. I neither heard nor read the IZL leader's speech. I am not interested in what he has to say. As a Council Member, Mr. Pinkas was entitled to ask certain questions. I will briefly answer those which concern the subject under review.

There was an agreement, which was violated by IZL from the outset...stating that IZL's arms and military equipment would be turned over unconditionally to the IDF....Even without a signed guarantee, IZL would still have been obliged to turn its weapons over. It was the Government's duty to seize them....

I agree that the Government need not always act according to the letter of the law....We must sometimes overlook certain things in order to combat danger to the security of the state. They sent unarmed men to the IDF and we supplied them with arms....We did not ask them why they had not turned over the arms in their possession. They were absorbed into the Army without undue difficulty. Nothing has happened

during the last three weeks to justify the violation of their...obligation. Why did they refuse to turn the armed ship over to the Government...?

Council Member Warhaftig asked why we fear an armed minority. We are terrified, Mr. Warhaftig. I do not think that I am more susceptible to fear than anyone else in Israel, but I am terrified of an armed minority. Why is it armed? For ornament? Everything has a purpose. Arms are used to kill people....It is distressing that mankind manufactures tools of destruction. What do other nations do? They impose restrictions on the possession of arms. People who carry lethal weapons are subject to strict discipline. They wear special uniforms. They are placed in enclosed camps or barracks....They are compelled to salute officers. Their freedom is restricted. Why is this done? So that armed men will not do as they please with their weapons, and will be subject to discipline. Mr. Warhaftig asked why we fear an armed minority....What is the armed minority for, whom does it represent and why does it need arms?

Rabbi Berlin condemned bloodshed....We do not want bloodshed. When there is an armed minority bloodshed is likely to occur. It has, in fact, shed Jewish blood in the past. Now it might shed non-Jewish blood, which should not happen either. We must ask why they need five thousand rifles. The rifles are not for the people, the Army or the state. What are they for? To fight the Arabs? They received weapons from us for that purpose. This Government and the Army have proved over the past six months that we can withstand the Arabs....I will not say that we have not had our failures. There have been failures. Failures occur even in armies which have existed for generations, in ancient and powerful countries. Our young Army defended us successfully. Be fair. Mistakes may be made. There may be elements in need of correction in the Army, but do not adopt that tone. Do not speak of the "reign of Sten guns."...People who have never held a gun to defend the Yishuv should show more respect for those who, by using Sten guns, saved the Yishuv. Show some respect, Mr. Weinstein! They have defended you, and will continue to do so, even if that entails sacrifices. They are prepared to make those sacrifices. Why, then, did those people refuse to turn their arms over to the Army or the Government?

This Government is engaged in a bitter war, and therefore needs arms. Jews acquired arms. Not ordinary Jews. Patriots and brave warriors. How can we avoid the question of why they did not hand over their arms? Whether there is an agreement or not, we are fighting for our existence and they refused to turn their arms over to the Army, to which their comrades belong and to which they swore allegiance. There were three IZL battalions in the Army. IZL members from these three battalions deserted in order to prevent the Government and the Army from having those arms. Why? Mr. Shapira cleverly suggested that we should have let the loaded ship sail. Unfortunately Mr. Shapira is not

the IZL leader and cannot make that decision. At Kfar Vitkin the ship received the order to sail west...but instead sailed to Tel Aviv and intentionally ran aground....Fortunately, this happened during a truce. Imagine what would have happened during hostilities. In another week the truce will end and our forces will be occupied all over the country....Imagine that while we were engaged in fighting the Arabs these heroes would have brought in five thousand rifles for themselves.

Despite the small amount of arms they have at present, they are attempting to dictate conditions, with the help of those who support them, knowingly or unknowingly. One rifle is enough to kill people. We do not want to have to go everywhere with bodyguards. I am ashamed of bodyguards. I know that if someone wants to kill someone he will, despite bodyguards....Five thousand rifles can kill the whole Yishuv. Five thousand rifles were not needed unless they were to be used to destroy the Yishuv. For fighting our enemies they received arms from us.

By denying IZL the armed ship we averted a terrible disaster. Never was the burning of a ship so important in the defense of the Yishuv as was the burning of the IZL ship....In my opinion, in this case even the sovereignty of the state is not important, although it is more significant than the truce. It is enough that Bevin, Nukrashi Pasha and other enemies deny the sovereignty of the state. Why should IZL join them? Still, I do not consider this the greatest danger. The greatest danger is the serious damage done to our capability to defend ourselves against Arab invasion. Imagine if...the ship had not been burnt and, instead of being destroyed, the arms had been unloaded and transferred to IZL's warehouses. Imagine that I am just an ordinary person, not a member of the Government. As an ordinary person I am sensible and I wonder what is happening. There is a war on. IZL members are in the Army and simultaneously possess separate arms. What for? For fighting the Arabs? For that they received weapons from the Government. The purpose is obviously to continue internal terrorism and conduct pogroms against those Jews who refuse to fund them. I am one of those who will not give in to terrorism. My Government is incapable of protecting me and of denying weapons to the terrorists. It is afraid to confiscate their arms. It is actually surrendering to them. My conclusion is that I must prevent terrorism myself. There are many like-minded people...of a brand that does not give in to terrorism. What will they do? They will acquire weapons. Why should IZL possess its own weapons while I, my sons and my friends do not? We have been familiar with weapons for forty years, and we know how to bring in ships. Even Bevin knows that. The Yishuv is heterogeneous, therefore each individual will acquire arms and form a private army.

I am a coward. I fear anyone who possesses illegal arms. Assuming that I am not unique, we will have as many private armies and agencies for acquiring arms as we do parties. Chaos! It will not be civil

war. It will be the "brotherhood" IZL desires. I realize that this is not what Mr. Shapira wants, but that is what his proposals imply. There are people who had private weapons. There was a time when local Jewish forces were private. There was no National Committee, Jewish Agency or any other organization responsible for protecting the Yishuv. There were "private initiatives," comprising young boys, pioneer workers, who took it upon themselves to defend the Yishuv. They did not protect worker's farms, for there were no such things at the time. They protected the "bourgeoisie," as they were called then. Rochevsky at Sejera was a "bourgeois." I protected his property. Ezekiel Nisanov, who was a Zionist worker, like myself, was prepared to die, and did so, in defense of his employer's two mules. His comrades did the same. It was an individual initiative. No public institution was responsible for this. When the general defense organization, Hashomer, was founded, guards turned their weapons over to the community and accepted its authority. Now there is a state, which protects the people.

Do you assume that if IZL organizes a private army with private arms, it will be the only organization to do so? The regime you recommend means civil war and the establishment of two separate armies. The primary result will be to wreck the war effort. Soldiers can fight alongside one another only if they feel equal and know that each one would give his life for the other. Soldiers must protect one another's lives. They cannot fight side by side if one of them has a private, hidden weapon in addition to the weapons they receive from the army. Private arms possessed by IZL or any other terrorist organization will inevitably split our Army....

The war is not yet over. There is a truce, but we do not decide how long it will last. It can end tomorrow....How can we conduct a war when there is no central authority, the army is not united, its soldiers do not share the same arms, and any terrorist gang can act as the IZL did? It invited journalists prior to the ship's arrival in Tel Aviv to publicize its act of heroism and condemn and disgrace this Government, which wanted those arms for the state. Can we fight in this manner? Tomorrow the war may be renewed. We will all need those Palmah members whom you scorn, Mr. Pinkas and Mr. Weinstein. We must all pray for a unified Army. It alone will be able to protect us. The war effort has been endangered. The IZL ship could have undermined our war effort. That had to be prevented. I believe that the fate of the armed ship was our salvation. IZL is responsible for the disaster. The Government, which was not led astray by misplaced compassion, is responsible for our salvation. Rabbi Berlin's compassion...could cause more bloodshed....Those who can foresee the future must prevent disasters....

We are not seeking revenge. If the matter were over, we would forget it. I am prepared to forgive and forget if IZL abandons its current policies...turning over its arms and military equipment to the Army

and registering for the draft like everyone else. Signing a scrap of paper is not enough. This Government will not sign agreements with anyone. The law of the state is binding on all citizens.

A great deal depends on those of you who have good intentions. You must stop helping those people, and demand...that everybody work together for the defense of the Jewish people....Only if they refrain from actions of this kind can we forget the past. Revenge is unnecessary. We have enough external enemies....That is what the Government has insisted upon.

If the Government...had exercised self-restraint and had not acted as it did, it would have destroyed the war effort and the state. It was preferable that the ship be burnt than that private arms be supplied to the dissidents. I am aware of the value of both the ship and the five thousand rifles, but it is better that the ship was burnt and the arms destroyed than that they reached their destination. The arms could have benefited the Government. IZL refused to turn them over, therefore it is better that they were either sunk or burnt. Blessed be the cannon that blasted that ship. Obviously, it would have been preferable to avoid the use of arms entirely and have the ship delivered intact. However, in view of the fact that this was not done, the best thing was to sink it.

Some people have claimed that the Provisional Government did not have the authority to do what it did. True, this Government is provisional. I hope that we are victorious soon, so that we may organize elections and you will be able to replace it. I am not impressed by Mr. Weinstein's piety on the subject of elections....Nonetheless, it is this Government's brief existence which will determine the future of the Jewish nation for decades, possibly centuries. These few months will determine our fate. If we can cooperate under a single authority and a unified Army, at least for the duration of the war, we will bring salvation to Israel for many generations to come. It is necessary, therefore, that the entire Council unite in support of the Government's struggle against the dissidents, and give its full approval to the action which prevented disaster. The Council must reinforce the Government's aspiration to ensure one Army, one discipline and one authority. If that is achieved we will forgive the dissidents and forget their past sins.

These are the Government's proposals to the Council of State, in contrast to those of Mr. Weinstein and Mr. Warhaftig.

(Mr. Weinstein's and Mr. Warhaftig's proposal to appoint a Commission of Inquiry was rejected. The resolution to consider the Government's proposal to approve the Government's action and appoint a Ministerial Committee at the next sitting was adopted.)

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Altalena Incident—Conclusion and Vote The Situation in Jerusalem

Introduction

Intensive consultations between the partners in the coalition during the night between June 23 and 24 resulted in the tacit withdrawal of the resignations of the Ministers representing the National Religious parties as well as in an agreement to establish a committee which would ensure the unity of the armed forces and their command, and would be entitled to "forgive past sins" once the implementation of these principles had been attained. The vote on the relevant resolution was largely formal, and the debate apparently procedural, but is reproduced here because of its political implications.

Subsequently, a debate was held on the situation in Jerusalem, and this was the first one in which all the Council Members who had been in the city during the siege were able to participate.

Sitting 6 of the Provisional Council of State

24 June 1948 (17 Sivan 5708)
JNF Building, Tel Aviv

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: We now proceed to the conclusion of the vote on the subject we discussed in the special sitting held yesterday evening. After that we will continue with the agenda, to which the topic of Jerusalem has been added.

Two proposals were presented to the Council yesterday evening. One of them was rejected, the other was deferred till today. It reads as follows: 1. The Council approves of the Government's actions designed to prevent IZL from bringing illegal arms into the state. This attempt to smuggle in arms constituted a base assault on the sovereignty of the state and a violation of the written undertaking made by that organization on 1 June 1948. The Council agrees to establish a Ministerial Committee to ensure a unified army and command as well as equality in the rights and duties of every recruit. Once these goals are attained, the practice, past crimes in this area will be forgiven.

Another proposal was made by Mr. Lurie. But if the Government's proposal is accepted, Mr. Lurie agrees to submit his as material for the Ministerial Committee.

Z. Lurie (Mapam): I have an amendment for this proposal. I would like to add: "The State of Israel will act in accordance with its laws and

finances regarding deserters, dissidents and persons undermining the authority of the state."

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: I would like to consult the Minister of Justice. The issue is clear concerning deserters, but is there any legal significance to the term "dissidents"? Is a court of law able to define a dissident?

The Minister of Justice, P. Rosenblueth: I believe so. The term has become recognized in this country.

Warhaftig (Mizrachi): We heard about the composition of the Ministerial Committee yesterday. I propose expanding the Committee by adding three Council Members. The Committee will then consist of six members, three appointed by the Provisional Government and three by the Council of State. I propose appointing Rabbi M. Berlin, Rabbi I. Meir-Levin and Mr. B. Repetor.... Had the Council of State not been convened now, I would have understood the Provisional Government being satisfied with a Committee of its own. However, since the Council of State was in session when the Committee was appointed, it seems illogical to continue with the subjects on the agenda without enabling the Council to be represented on the Committee. I request that the vote on my proposal precede the other votes.

M. Weinstein (Hatzohar): I would like to know what the Committee's authority will be. I would like a clear and explicit answer.

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: The functions of the Committee are two-fold. Its first goal is to guarantee the existence of an authority in this state which controls a unified army, i.e., to ensure that the fourth clause of the Military Ordinance is upheld and that there is equality in the rights and duties of every recruit. Once the first function is implemented the Committee will see to it that all crimes committed in this area pertaining to the Army or the insurrection are pardoned. The Committee will do everything necessary to achieve these two goals.

Rabbi M. Berlin (Mizrachi): Will the Committee deal with matters which occurred in the past? Will it have the authority to demand the material required for its investigation from Ministers, officials and clerks?

M. Cohen (Wizo): If the Committee is to be expanded, I propose that we include a seventh member, Bebbba Idelson.

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: Some additions to the Government's proposal have been suggested. The first is an additional clause and the second is an amendment to the clause regarding the composition of the Committee. One amendment proposes adding three more

members to the Committee, the other proposes adding four, in which case the Committee would include a woman.

B. Weinstein (Hatzohar): I suggest that we split the proposal into two parts, the first being a vote of confidence and the second a roll-call vote.

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: This subject does not call for a vote of confidence in the Government! I do not think that the Government will object to a roll-call vote.

Z. Warhaftig (Mizrachi): I suggest that we vote on the proposal clause by clause rather than holding one general vote.

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: That is obvious. First I will put the amendments to the vote. Then we will vote on the additions to the second clause. Then we will vote on the proposal. If the proposal to appoint additional members to the Committee is adopted the number and names of the additional members will have to be decided....

The Minister of Agriculture, A. Zisling: I do not believe that the Government's proposal can be divided up. Either it can be voted on as an integral proposal or we can vote on the various proposals. That way additions can be made and the vote taken afterwards.

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: If we follow the procedure I have proposed the vote will not be divided up but will pertain to an amendment regarding the composition rather than the function of the Committee. The Government appointed a Committee and the Council submitted a proposal to add its own members to it. This amendment does not contradict the Government's proposal. Whether it is adopted or not, it in no way alters the character of the Government's proposal.

A. Katznelson (Mapai): I understood Mr. Zisling's suggestion differently. I believe he wanted us to vote on the amendment as a separate item.

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: When we get to that we will have to check the Council regulations and decide accordingly.

The Minister of Agriculture, A. Zisling: If we are voting on an amendment, I would like to vote first on an amendment regarding content. Accordingly, there should be a preliminary vote on Mr. Lurie's proposal. The Committee will have to act in accordance with the content of that proposal.

The Foreign Minister, M. Shertok: It seems to me that the Chairman has two options open to him. One is to break the proposal down, so that Mr. Lurie's proposal appears as an amendment rather than an addition. Thus, we will vote on the first part, then on the second part, and after that on Mr. Lurie's proposal, each item being adopted or rejected.

Only if the proposal is voted on in full can Mr. Lurie's suggestion be voted on as an amendment prior to the proposal.

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: The Minister of Justice has just shown me the clause in the Council regulations which states: "The Chairman shall determine the voting order."

M. Shattner (Mapai): Does the Government agree to Mr. Warhaftig's proposal?

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: The Government has not discussed the matter, and I cannot speak for it.

The Vote

Those in favor of appointing Council Members to the Committee	17
Those against	5
(The amendment is adopted.)	
Those in favor of adding three Members	9
Those in favor of adding four Members	12
(It is decided that four Council Members shall be appointed.)	

Rabbi M. Berlin (Mizrachi): If we are permitted to propose additions to the Committee, I would like to suggest one more, bringing the total to five.

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: It cannot be changed after the vote has been held. The number we decided on was four.

Rabbi M. Berlin (Mizrachi): In that case I would like to ask whether someone may yield his seat to someone else later on?

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: We have not yet reached the stage of discussing names. I will now put the second amendment—Mr. Lurie's—to a vote.

I. Ben-Zvi (Mapai): Would the state be acting in accordance with its laws without this amendment?

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: One could say that since the issue is self-evident, there is no need to vote on it.

The Minister of Health and Immigration, M. Shapira: I suggest that we do not vote on subjects which are self-evident.

The Minister of Agriculture, A. Zisling: If there was no need to deal with self-evident subjects we would have nothing to discuss in this

Council. It is obvious that there is a central authority in the State of Israel which is responsible for every military action and defense issue in the country. Therefore, the first two clauses, as well as the Committee and the investigation, are unnecessary. If people want to elect another committee to investigate matters, it must be understood that this will be restricted to an investigation governed by the laws which apply to all the citizens of the State of Israel. All laws are self-evident, yet they are passed nonetheless. There is a passage elucidating the limitations of the Committee within the constitutional framework. The citizens of the State of Israel must be made to understand that breaking the law of the land will not be tolerated.

The Minister of Health and Immigration, M. Shapira: Minister Zisling's suggestion appears to be superfluous. The Committee was appointed to perform certain defined functions. I assume that we will have a basic military code which will include clauses on desertion. Otherwise, desertion may become widespread in the Army. But why must we rehash this issue just now? Surely it will be in our basic constitution. How will this proposal benefit us? In my opinion, it is superfluous. It is better to leave basic constitutional matters to legislators. Our laws should not be passed in this fashion. The subject has been brought before the Council, which will have an opportunity to discuss it, but not in the way Minister Zisling has proposed.

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: Since clause 3 (Mr. Lurie's proposed amendment) is self-evident, it is proposed that we remove it from the agenda.

The Vote

Those in favor of removing Mr. Lurie's amendment from the agenda	19
Those against	8
(The proposal is adopted.)	
Those in favor of the first section of the Government's proposal	24
Those against	4
(The proposal is adopted.)	
Those in favor of the second section of the Government's proposal	22
Those against	8
(The proposal is adopted.)	

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: The following Council Members have been nominated for the Committee: Rabbi M. Berlin, Rabbi M. Levin, B. Repetor and B. Idelson.

Rabbi M. Berlin (Mizrachi): I would like my name removed from the list. I believe that the idea of the Committee was considered in advance with the intention of including some members rather than others. I have no animosity towards Mrs. Idelson and the circles she represents, heaven forfend, and am willing to sit with her on this Committee. However, I believe that there is no need for the number of members on the Committee to exceed six. It was on that premise that I abstained from the previous vote. If the number of Council Members had not been part of the last vote I would not have abstained, as I am in favor of the first part of the proposal. However, as the number seven was accepted, I opposed it.

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: We will respect your wishes. I would like to say, however, that the Committee as a body will not be involved in decision-making. It will only investigate, summarize and submit proposals. I am surprised that Rabbi Berlin has declined to participate in the Committee solely because the Council rejected his views on the number of members. There are now three nominees. We can nominate either one more or a fifth.

The Foreign Minister, M. Shertok: I nominate Minister Moshe Shapira.

A. Stop (General Zionists): I regret the fact that Rabbi Berlin has declined the nomination. I would like to nominate Rabbi Fishman.

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: Rabbi Fishman is absent. I therefore propose that the nomination be withdrawn.

A. Stop (General Zionists): I withdraw my nomination.

(The proposal to add four Council Members—B. Idelson, Rabbi I. Levin, B. Repetor and M. Shapira—to the Ministerial Committee is adopted.)

D. Pinkas (Mizrachi): I would like to make a statement. When, with other members, I participated on behalf of the National Committee in negotiations with the leaders of IZL regarding the well-known agreement, the position of the other members was that there should be no Jewish underground under Jewish rule. In my view, this constituted the basis of the agreement. It is quite clear to me that the Government's sovereignty over weapons must be absolute and complete, and that no individual may use weapons which are not authorized by it. However, I was unable to approve of the Government's actions regarding the ship. When the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense failed to answer my

questions on certain important points, leaving doubts in my mind as to the justice of the Government's actions, I voted against approving those actions.

The Minister of Agriculture, A. Zisling: I would like to make a statement. As a Minister and representative of my party on the Council, I abstained from voting on the proposal submitted here. We were prepared to support the Government's proposal *in toto*, whether we were satisfied with its formulation or not. But that proposal was dismembered today when it was submitted clause by clause rather than as a general Government proposal. We opposed the text of the second section from the outset, and this has been reinforced by the sequence of events at this sitting.

Neither my party nor I have any reservations about the appointment of Council Members to committees. We demanded this not only on questions of policy, but also on other topics on the agenda. This time, however, there was a special significance to the request for additional Committee members. The same people who abstained from the vote on the first clause voted on the second one, which determined the Government's freedom to act and appointed additional members to the Committee. Questions concerning the composition of the Committee were raised, as if the intention was to check its orientation. When the proposal was broken up into separate clauses, although my party had withdrawn its proposal at the start of the debate, agreeing to have it investigated at a later date, we tried to amend it with a brief phrase intended to elucidate the subject. But we were told that this was evident from the actual proposal. The same members who were satisfied with the term "self-evident" regarding the first clause (and who abstained from the vote), demand a clear interpretation of the second one (regarding concessions) and are dissatisfied with the term "self-evident." We feel that this gives rise to doubts as to awareness of the danger posed by forces which break their word and threaten the integrity, security and basis of our state.

Although we did not vote against the proposal, we have no intention of supporting the adoption of this part of it, and will continue to fight in the Government and the Council of State to impose the authority of the state on any group intending to destroy or violate it by attempting to organize as an independent force....

Z. Warhaftig (Mizrachi): Let us return to the agenda. As we are about to conclude one section of the agenda, I would like to request a short recess so that I may prepare a statement on behalf of my party....

(The sitting is recessed for ten minutes.)

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: We will devote one hour to the subject of Jerusalem, and the remaining time to the other topics.

I. Ben-Zvi (Mapai): I did not request that Jerusalem be discussed in order to furnish you with information, since this has already been supplied. What I would like to do is present some conclusions and offer concrete suggestions.

First of all, I would like to note the heroism of the struggle for Jerusalem, the Yishuv and the whole country; this was displayed not only in and around Jerusalem, but on every front. I will not comment on the heroism which saved Jerusalem from great danger. As you know, Jerusalem was the most forward position and, though badly hit, suffered in silence and held on heroically. The heroism elsewhere may be less well known. Suffice it to say that of those who fell, 20 percent were in Jerusalem, while 80 percent were elsewhere.

There is, however, not only the danger of an attack like the one Jerusalem experienced, without sufficient military support and supplies. There is also the danger of economic ruin. We are already facing economic collapse. Commerce, industry and labor are breaking down. It is enough to walk through the streets of Jerusalem during the truce...to see how ravaged they are. It is enough to visit some of the neighborhoods to feel the desolation of the city. Though one sees people in the streets, everything is silent.

I am sorry to point out that there has been very little communication, coordination or consultation between the defense forces and the public. If we examine the general enlistment for full or partial service, for example, the story of the numerous evasions of military service in Jerusalem is proved to be exaggerated. There were some cases, it is true, but they were few and did not constitute a serious problem. Mobilization in Jerusalem did not correspond with training facilities, nor with the weapons and supplies available. There was an immense waste of time and manpower even at the recruitment stage.

These facts bear witness to the lack of coordination, consultation and communication between the military leadership and the representatives of the public. I protest against this vehemently. Moreover, orders were given by the military command without any consultation with or authorization by the Civil Government, especially with regard to the recruitment of teachers and students....As a result, the upper grades of schools were closed for no good reason. There are fourteen thousand schoolchildren in Jerusalem, and because teachers were drafted the lower grades were also closed needlessly. The tenth and eleventh grades still remain closed. The National Committee, which is responsible for education, ordered the resumption of studies, but since the orders releasing teachers, as well as students over sixteen, from active duty has not yet been put into effect, there are no regular studies in the schools.

The interruption of studies should have been undertaken in consultation with the public, but this was not done. There are no bounds to mili-

tary authority. I do not oppose this in times of war, when wider powers are imperative. But certain things should remain under civil authority, especially in the economic sphere. Such issues should be decided through consultation, but this did not exist.

Some mention has been made of the painful spectacle of plunder in the Jerusalem neighborhoods which our soldiers miraculously captured. This scourge has not ceased, and has caused demoralization. For a long time no one spoke of it, but it is a well-known fact. Demoralization has gripped both the community and the Army. It began as a result of the actions of IZL but also spread to more "respectable" people. This must be stopped. I know that the appropriate orders have been given, but they have not been implemented because the necessary executive powers do not exist. I draw this to the attention of the Council and the Minister of Defense.

There has been a demand for a public committee of inquiry to examine the dreadful events which occurred in Jerusalem. There may have been internal committees of inquiry, but it must be realized that the public is also deeply concerned about the matter. The population of Jerusalem is still upset about the 110 victims of the Sheikh Jarrah incident, when the convoy to the University and Hadassah Hospital was ambushed. This requires serious investigation. Moreover, the population is in daily contact with the refugees from the Old City. This whole affair and the circumstances leading up to it, namely, whether flight was necessary or not, is not only a military issue. Maybe there should first have been consultations, followed by an inquiry. No such committee was appointed, however, despite the fact that the members of the National Committee—who are members of this Council—asked the Government and the Prime Minister to do so. It is our duty to determine whether the failure in the Old City was objectively justified or not, and if not, we must examine the circumstances in order to learn from them. The subject of Jerusalem is not yet closed. We must anticipate a fiercer struggle and greater dangers once the truce is over.

I will not speak here of military matters. Suffice it to say that the limits of the authority of the Military Government must be determined. I do not know whether there is a state of emergency in Jerusalem or not. Nobody knows that. If there is, the local military command must also include a civil division, as is general practice in other countries. If there is no state of emergency, however, that organ must have a constitutional basis. We should not have to face the internal fragmentation resulting from a lack of defined limits to military authority. It has given rise to feelings that we are not adequately prepared for the dangers ahead, and this has a bad influence on both the public and the Army. This must come to an end. There are only ten or twelve days of the truce left.

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: If that.

I. Ben-Zvi (Mapai): This cannot be delayed. I ask the Council and the Government to adopt a regulation determining the limits of military and civil government, thereby putting an end to phenomena of the sort we have recently witnessed. A new type of order must be established in Jerusalem without delay.

Rabbi M. Berlin (Jerusalem): I am afraid that the fate of Jerusalem in this Council will be like that of the Hebrew language at the Zionist Congress, that is to say, it is allocated a brief hour, after which it does not regain the position it deserves....I cannot make do with five minutes. I will try to be brief, but I will say whatever I find necessary.

I accuse the entire Government that during the five weeks since we proclaimed our statehood not one Minister has come to Jerusalem to see what is happening there. No one believes all those stories about there being no airplanes and no other way of reaching the city, because, thank God, there were airplanes with supplies which reached us....But not one Minister made his way to Jerusalem throughout those five weeks. It was not even considered necessary to make an airplane available to a resident of Jerusalem so that the city's message could be conveyed directly. And so, for five weeks there was no contact by either letter or telegram. After a radio connection was finally established and many questions asked, the only answer we received was: "The enemy is probably listening." There was no connection, and no one can be blamed for that, but why did nobody come? I make this accusation not on behalf of myself but on behalf of the thousands of people in Jerusalem.

No one knew, or knows to this day, which institution is entitled to express an opinion on the subject of Jerusalem in the political sphere. Six institutions are contending with one another: 1. the Municipality—a legal body; 2. the Community Council—a legal body; 3. the Jerusalem Council—which thinks that it deals with political issues, whether by order or not I do not know; 4. the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency, which regards itself as the legal body, since two or three of its members have lived in Jerusalem...; 5. a remnant of the National Committee, i.e., 10 of its members who were caught in Jerusalem; 6. a Government representative, i.e., one of the Ministers who happened to be in Jerusalem....These are the institutions, not one of which knows what to do in Jerusalem.

The status of Jerusalem is still not clear. On this issue I would like to say that I feel that a great mistake is being made. We have established a Jewish state—and I believe that this is one of the happiest and most successful events in our lives. Although we know that the resolution of November 29 has already lost much of its vitality (not officially, perhaps, but certainly compared with the spirit of Lake Success), we put our trust in that fateful resolution and proclaimed a Jewish state. How-

ever, we have not yet established a political executive for international Jerusalem.

Let no one suspect that I belittle Jerusalem's sanctity and its right to be our capital, but I am convinced that at present we cannot rule Jerusalem. People are already speaking of one section being under our authority and another under a different one. This no longer sounds like the division between Arabs and Jews that was once spoken of, and seems to indicate allotting one section to Abdullah and the other to the Jews.

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: I am bound by the regulations, and your time is up. I can only ask the Council whether it will allow you to continue your speech.

M. Shattner (Mapai): I move that we do not limit Rabbi Berlin to the official time allotted for speeches.

B. Repetor (Mapam): I move that we add to the time allotted for speeches by members from Jerusalem, though not by other Council Members.

(Members from Jerusalem were granted an extra five minutes of speaking time.)

Rabbi M. Berlin (Jerusalem): I thank all the Council Members for their help. What I must say here grieves me, and I am already forced by the time limit to speak too quickly.

Another misfortune afflicting Jerusalem is the panic to leave the city. People are already drawing parallels with Safed. Some even say that if it were permissible to leave the city today scarcely ten individuals would remain. I am not such a pessimist, but it is no exaggeration to say that 50 percent of Jerusalem's inhabitants would leave. The Government can do something to relieve this problem. Many officials of the National Institutions are being moved from Jerusalem. I believe that the number of these transfers should be reduced. Moreover, if officials are to be moved, efforts should be made to ensure that their families remain....They are no better than other people. If they remain in Jerusalem it will not be emptied out with every day and every bus. There will be plenty of time for them to move to Tel Aviv when the situation in Jerusalem is quiet and less fraught than it is now. It is estimated that between 15,000 and 20,000 people have left Jerusalem. This may be an exaggeration, but it is bad enough to know that such rumors exist.

...When an official leaves, the entire neighborhood says: he is an official, he must know why he is leaving; it is a sign that there must be some danger. Officials are regarded as being close to the Government. Not only officials have erred in this respect, the highest echelons of government have done so too.

Spirits in Jerusalem are low. Someone asked me: "Why are the people of Tel Aviv so brave? After a bombing raid they sit in cafes." The man who asked me that is not so simple-minded that he cannot distin-

guish between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Apart from the unique mentality of many people in Jerusalem, there is another difference: these people are without food, fuel, water, electricity, candles, radio and newspapers. They lack contact with the world. There is still no regular postal service in Jerusalem. I do not understand why this cannot be arranged. We still have not succeeded in ensuring that telegrams arrive on time instead of after a delay of two weeks. I do not understand why this cannot be corrected. In addition, people are hungry. Gentlemen, I am neither poor nor greedy, yet even I was hungry. Obviously, it is at least as bad for the poorer classes. Bread and water were available in only limited amounts, and the water had to be fetched by the women, whether sick or pregnant. One had to wait in queues for commodities while shells whistled overhead.

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: The Council has already heard all this many times. There has been a decision according to which I must now interrupt the speaker, unless the Council revokes this.

(It is decided that speeches made by Members from Jerusalem should not be limited in time.)

Rabbi M. Berlin (Jerusalem): I have not had the opportunity of speaking about Jerusalem for six weeks. Whether you have heard what I have to say or not, may you have the strength to listen once more, and not forget Jerusalem.

The situation in Jerusalem differs from that in other places in the country in yet another sphere. Food is scarce there. History has taught us what this means. Some people have experienced this in the past. As a result, there is fear and anxiety....Jerusalem is blessed by being surrounded by high mountains, but in some ways that is a curse. There is shooting from the mountains, from all sides, at any hour. No one knows where and when he is safe....

I would like to tell the Minister of Defense that I appreciate what was done on the road to Jerusalem—the battles and the opening of the Burma Road....We bless you and your colleagues for your achievements. But this is no justification for what was not done. First of all, the city's official status must be guaranteed. Had there been a properly-worded declaration regarding the status of Jerusalem and its link with the State of Israel, the situation might have been saved. Consequently, I ask you, and the Foreign Minister in particular, to see to it that whenever this subject is discussed, whether by political leaders or experts, someone from Jerusalem is invited to participate. If two representatives are sent, the third should be from Jerusalem. Many people feel that it would be beneficial if someone were to speak on behalf of Jerusalem at Lake Success too, even though Dr. Eliash, a leading Jerusalem resident, is there.

Gentlemen...most of the Jews of Jerusalem are religious. I do not like using this term at all, but there are many people for whom a state-

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ment issued by a religious authority is considerably more meaningful than any political declaration. When we are facing a bitter war in Jerusalem, we must have faith and be confident, so as to not even entertain the idea of a template surrender....An acknowledged religious authority must be involved, though this need not necessarily comprise party leaders. I am glad to say that when we conferred with the Chief Rabbi, Rabbi Dushinsky of Agudat Israel also participated. We recognize him as someone who understands the problems, is devoted to the revival of Israel, and protects the unity of the nation and helps the war effort....If we forbid, we are forced to fight in Jerusalem, let the Chief Rabbi, Rabbi Dushinsky be involved in the political aspect, so that they will be able to tell all those who listen to them: "We have discussed the problems and have concluded that we must fight; we must be ready for battle and sacrifices," rather than having to tell their followers: "Other part of our state, whether linked to us territorially by means of a corridor or not. This declaration must be made here, and I am certain that I appeal to you...the leaders of the Jewish state, to come to Jerusalem. You will not make it easier for the city by creating yet another committee, nor by granting political accreditation to one official or another. Instead, help create a suitable political leadership which will include the Chief Rabbi...and Rabbi Dushinsky...who are regarded by the Jews as an authority. Save Jerusalem and do not transfer any morsels of income. People are forced to subsist on the little they have. If officials away from it; let their wives remain in Jerusalem together with all the other wives.

I appeal to you...the leaders of the Jewish state, to come to Jerusalem. You will not make it easier for the city by creating yet another committee, nor by granting political accreditation to one official or another. Instead, help create a suitable political leadership which will include the Chief Rabbi...and Rabbi Dushinsky...who are regarded by the Jews as an authority. Save Jerusalem and do not transfer any morsels of income. People are forced to subsist on the little they have. If officials away from it; let their wives remain in Jerusalem together with all the other wives.

...I hope that my colleague in the JNF, Dr. Granowsky, will tell you about the Jerusalem Company. Now, of all times, when there is depression and depression, we must begin to build Jerusalem. Now, at these times, we must prove that we are not surrendering. There have been rumors that the University is leaving and that Hadassah Hospital should be moved. We must tell the people of Jerusalem that we will strengthen the city. Jerusalem is ours. We must begin working with all the strength and conviction to build up the city. Anyone who rebuilds Jerusalem's destroyed areas should be paid twice or three times as much as anyone else. Save Jerusalem! Come to Jerusalem and help give the city a stable political and economic basis. We cannot ignore Jerusalem's plight.

A. Granowsky (Jerusalem): Please try to understand the great sensitivity of the people of Jerusalem when they enter our world, after several weeks of siege, and speak to us about their city. Anyone who did not experience that dreadful period in the besieged city cannot understand the sensitivity of the people of Jerusalem.

During my six days of leisure in Tel Aviv I have learned that I am incapable of explaining everything we have undergone. I would like to raise several issues which, in my opinion, are of great significance for the immediate as well as the more distant future. First priority must be given to supporting Jerusalem, and by this I do not mean flimsy declarations

people of Jerusalem are depressed. Now that the most difficult period is over, the shelling has stopped and the tensions faced by the people of Jerusalem have subsided, depression has set in, and it is growing. The Yishuv is anxious about its future. It does not know what is to come.

This depression has set in because the people felt isolated. It is irrelevant whether this feeling is objectively justified or not. What is significant is that it is shared by a population of 100,000. This feeling can be a great consequence and we must fight it. We must provide the people of Jerusalem with the support they feel they have lacked till now. We must act to make Jerusalem feel that it is an inseparable part of the State of Israel. I am aware of the problems inherent in a political declaration of this sort, but clearly it is essential to proclaim that Jerusalem is part of our state, whether linked to us territorially by means of a corridor or not. This declaration must be made here, and I am certain that all encourage the inhabitants of Jerusalem.

Rabbi Berlin spoke of the danger of people leaving the city. One should not exaggerate the extent of the phenomenon, but nonetheless its extent should not be disregarded. In economic terms, the devastation of the city is terrible. The blow to the city's economy has affected all Jews as an authority. Save Jerusalem and do not transfer any morsels of income. People are forced to subsist on the little they have. If officials do not immediately initiate projects for reviving Jerusalem's economy, the city is doomed to become one of the neglected corners of the State of Israel.

While we were under siege we attempted to do something with our scarce resources. As a result of institutional initiative, an economic company for Jerusalem has been established, and has already established two subsidiary companies. The decision to establish one of those subsidiaries was taken the day before the truce, while the shelling was in full swing. Thus, the Civil Aviation Company, to maintain communications between Jerusalem and the world, was founded. The first company is to erect industrial complexes for developing and strengthening the city's industry.

There is still a great deal to be done. The programs must still be worked out in greater detail. However, this should not be the work of the inhabitants of Jerusalem alone, but of the entire state. I recommend that the Government form a department to deal specifically with the problems of Jerusalem....The people of Jerusalem must participate in this planning and implementation. We want to share in the rehabilitation of the city. We are in dire need of many projects, and, taking the work that has already been done into consideration, I see numerous possibilities. Jerusalem is capable of developing sources of income for a great many people.

There are certain groups of Jews who want to live only in Jerusalem. Therefore, we must strengthen the religious and cultural life of the city.

ment issued by a religious authority is considerably more meaningful than any political declaration. When we are facing a bitter war in Jerusalem, we must have faith and be confident, so as to not even contemplate surrender....An acknowledged religious authority must be involved, though this need not necessarily comprise party leaders. I am glad to say that when we conferred with the Chief Rabbis, Rabbi Dushinsky of Agudat Israel also participated. We recognize him as someone who understands the problems, is devoted to the revival of Israel, as we are, protects the unity of the nation and helps the war effort....If, God forbid, we are forced to fight in Jerusalem, let the Chief Rabbis and Rabbi Dushinsky be involved in the political aspect, so that they will be able to tell all those who listen to them: "We have discussed the issue and have concluded that we must fight; we must be ready for battle and for sacrifices," rather than having to tell their followers: "Other people say—." Let these rabbis play a part in political matters.

I appeal to you...the leaders of the Jewish state, to come to Jerusalem. You will not make it easier for the city by creating yet another committee, nor by granting political accreditation to one official or another. Instead, help create a suitable political leadership which will include the Chief Rabbis...and Rabbi Dushinsky...who are regarded by many Jews as an authority. Save Jerusalem and do not transfer any more officials away from it; let their wives remain in Jerusalem together with all the other wives.

...I hope that my colleague in the JNF, Dr. Granowsky, will tell you about the Jerusalem Company. Now, of all times, when there is destruction and depression, we must begin to build Jerusalem. Now, of all times, we must prove that we are not surrendering. There have been rumors that the University is leaving and that Hadassah Hospital will be moved. We must tell the people of Jerusalem that we will strengthen the city. Jerusalem is ours. We must begin working with all our strength and conviction to build up the city. Anyone who rebuilds Jerusalem's destroyed areas should be paid twice or three times as much as anyone else. Save Jerusalem! Come to Jerusalem and help give the city a stable political and economic basis. We cannot ignore Jerusalem's plight.

A. Granowsky (Jerusalem): Please try to understand the great excitement of people from Jerusalem when they enter our world, after several weeks of siege, and speak to us about their city. Anyone who did not experience that dreadful period in the besieged city cannot understand the sensitivity of the people of Jerusalem.

During my six days of leisure in Tel Aviv I have learned that I am incapable of explaining everything we have undergone. I would like to raise several issues which, in my opinion, are of great significance for the immediate as well as the more distant future. First priority must go to supporting Jerusalem, and by this I do not mean flimsy declarations.

The people of Jerusalem are depressed. Now that the most difficult period is over, the shelling has stopped and the tensions faced by the Yishuv for weeks have subsided, depression has set in, and it is growing. The Yishuv is anxious about its future. It does not know what is to come.

This depression has set in because the people felt isolated. It is irrelevant whether this feeling is objectively justified or not. What is significant is that it is shared by a population of 100,000. This feeling can be a factor of great consequence and we must fight it. We must provide the Jews of Jerusalem with the support they feel they have lacked till now. We must act to make Jerusalem feel that it is an inseparable part of the State of Israel. I am aware of the problems inherent in a political declaration of this sort, but clearly it is essential to proclaim that Jerusalem is part of our state, whether linked to us territorially by means of a corridor or not. This declaration must be made here, and I am certain that it will encourage the inhabitants of Jerusalem.

Rabbi Berlin spoke of the danger of people leaving the city. One must not exaggerate the extent of the phenomenon, but nonetheless its gravity should not be disregarded. In economic terms, the devastation in the city is terrible. The blow to the city's economy has affected all sources of income. People are forced to subsist on the little they have. If we do not immediately initiate projects for reviving Jerusalem's economy, the city is doomed to become one of the neglected corners of the country.

While we were under siege we attempted to do something with our own scarce resources. As a result of institutional initiative, an economic company for Jerusalem has been established, and has already formed two subsidiary companies. The decision to establish one of those subsidiaries was taken the day before the truce, while the shelling was still in full swing. Thus, the Civil Aviation Company, to maintain communications between Jerusalem and the world, was founded. The other company is to erect industrial complexes for developing and strengthening the city's industry.

There is still a great deal to be done. The programs must still be worked out in greater detail. However, this should not be the work of the inhabitants of Jerusalem alone, but of the entire state. I recommend that the Government form a department to deal specifically with the problems of Jerusalem....The people of Jerusalem must participate in this planning and implementation. We want to share in the rehabilitation of the city. We are in dire need of many projects, and, taking the work that has already been done into consideration, I see numerous possibilities. Jerusalem is capable of developing sources of income for a great many people.

There are certain groups of Jews who want to live only in Jerusalem. Therefore, we must strengthen the religious and cultural

institutions of the city, and the University first and foremost. Together with other cultural institutions, both religious and secular, the University can serve not only as an important institution of learning and a great cultural center for the state and Judaism as a whole, but also as an employer and source of income for hundreds of families in Jerusalem. We must strengthen the University immediately, as it is currently in a very bad financial position.

Through three of its committees, the Jerusalem Company has prepared programs, but on our own we are incapable of implementing our vision of a large city of Jerusalem with a strong Jewish population. We need the active participation of the Government of the state. Through the joint efforts of the Government and the Jews of the city, we will be able to put an end to the threat to Jerusalem's future of wholesale departures. What I am demanding of the Government is the creation of a special administrative and economic instrument which will deal with Jerusalem's problems and direct its rehabilitation programs.

S. Kobashi (Jerusalem): I would like to speak about the poverty and the prevailing mood in Jerusalem. I have noticed a spirit of surrender amongst the poorer Jews of the city, caused by the fear of military incompetence as well as economic privation. I know that many poor families in Jerusalem were deprived of bread and water to a greater extent than other groups in the city. I know of families of ten and more members which fled from the suburbs during the shelling and went to live in neighborhoods which seemed safer to them, sleeping on the ground with no one to take care of them. I know of poor families which asked the authorities for help and received no response.

More than the emotional suffering, the prevailing economic hardship robs people of their dignity. We must encourage the inhabitants, especially the poorer sections, so that their spirits do not fall. Their economic situation must be attended to, so that they do not have to endure hunger. If they no longer feel that they are abandoned, we will be able to secure Jerusalem and will not have to fear that people will leave the city.

I know of people who thought not only in terms of defeat but even of surrender. We prevented them from acting foolishly only after a great deal of persuasion. On the other hand, I also know of many people who manned positions, aiding the defense forces and returning home after 24 hours without bread or water. They did not abandon the city, nor did their spirits fall. I ask the Council Members to ensure that Jerusalem's economic conditions will continue to improve, and that the poor be dealt with in particular.

I would like the support to be not only of a political nature, but also to encourage the feeling of security and alleviate the economic anxieties of the poor. We must protect these classes because they are the basis of the Yishuv in Jerusalem. Do not let these people feel besieged within a siege, but allow them to feel that they are an integral part of the

Yishuv....Not enough attention has been paid to the hoarding of food. We must not delude ourselves that this problem will resolve itself.

A. Katznelson (Jerusalem): The day will come when a book will be written about "Jerusalem's thirty days." In Tel Aviv I do not speak to gatherings about Jerusalem during that period because I know that the time is not yet ripe to tell that story....We are only in a period of truce, perhaps a very short one, and residents of Jerusalem know all too well what the end of the truce means. At present we must still hold our peace.

Jerusalem also knew how to hold its peace. Its heroism was reflected in the fact that it suffered in silence. I spent entire days in the stations of blood and tears, and I was surprised to see Sephardi women next to the crushed and mangled bodies of their loved ones without crying. After all, it is known how Sephardi women react to the death of a relative. Tears flowed for the blood that had been shed, but no cries were heard.

...The heroism of women was extremely important at the Jerusalem front. It was supreme heroism. They were forced to move from a normal life style to one known to us only from descriptions of the siege of Leningrad in Russian literature. Our women had to adjust to using wood instead of fuel; they had to build their own wood-burning stoves for cooking inside their homes; they had to use candle stumps instead of electricity; they had to stand in line for water rations during heavy shelling. All this concerned primarily the women, and if we were to award Jerusalem medals, they would have to go first and foremost to the housewives and mothers. Women were the major victims injured by shells because they were out in the streets....In Jerusalem one did not walk. One had to run, because there were no warning sirens when the shelling started....

I will not bring up grudging arguments about isolation, since we knew quite well that the Yishuv was with us. We knew what was being done on the road to Jerusalem, we saw the Palmach battalions and knew what had been done in the Old City and at the Etzion Bloc. There was no isolation with regard to all that. Isolation existed in only one area, the lack of communication with the leadership. Why were military or political district officers responsible for Jerusalem during that period? I ask this with all due respect for their work. Why was there no authoritative military or political leadership which could work in coordination with the local populace (for it too has the right to participate in decisions which concern it)? We could not understand that. Even now this can be corrected only by a Government delegation, which should be sent to Jerusalem for a few days to consult with the residents about concerted action, local organization and the settlement of the relations between the various bodies. Soon it will be too late to correct all this.

We would not have forgiven a foreign government for having deserted us during the siege of Jerusalem, and we will certainly not forgive our own for doing so. Only now, after thirty days of shelling, is the

reaction to the shock to Jerusalem beginning to be felt. The city will not recover quickly, particularly if new upheavals are experienced. Consequently, a tremendous effort must be made to encourage the public, prevent people leaving and recruit all the local forces.

I would say that Rabbi Berlin was privileged to be in Jerusalem during that period. I personally would be unhappy had I not been there then, and I am very glad that I can return there tomorrow, taking with me provisions for the city's hospitals for at least one month. We must begin fortifying Jerusalem immediately. That necessitates unifying forces there, as well as mobilizing an entire team of people, even at the expense of the state, the Government or the bureaucracy. The Jewish Agency building is completely empty, not one room is occupied, except for those used by the Military Government. How can this be? Is this the way to treat the edifice which once housed the representatives of the Jewish people?

Declarations about the future of the city are not important at this moment. We want Jerusalem to be Jewish, just as the state is Jewish. After the resolution of November 29, Jerusalem must be Jewish. We want a Jewish Jerusalem, a Jewish Municipality and internal cohesion, even if this is only unofficially so. But this requires cooperation between Jerusalem and the state, and the path to this has not yet been found. No effort has been made to secure minimal links.

I think that the principal conclusion of this Council should be that Members of the Government should go to Jerusalem for two or three days soon, perhaps tomorrow, while it is still possible and the city's streets are not under constant bombardment (it is not easy to live under a barrage of shells), to give advice on how to fortify the city internally...in preparation for the days to come.

Z. Warhaftig (Jerusalem): The mood in Jerusalem was just as it has been described by the previous speakers, and resulted from a feeling of having been forgotten. This feeling was unpleasant and distressing. It seemed to us that we had also been forgotten in the political sense. The Provisional Government was so busy with the war effort and establishing and maintaining the state, that Jerusalem was forgotten. It seemed to us that our voice was not heard by the world, despite the constant bombing of the city (10,500 shells fell on Jerusalem, 250-300 people were killed and at least 1,500 injured). Perhaps our impression was unjustified, but we were cut off from the rest of the world. We had no access to newspapers. Consequently, we were under the impression that the Government of Israel had not voiced its protest against the monthlong bombardment of the Holy City, and the downpour of shells on men, women and children.

Perhaps it was impossible to mobilize a military force powerful enough to silence the guns of Transjordan and Egypt, supplied by England. Each and every shell, with its British label, caused us to feel that

there was not sufficient reaction by the supposedly civilized nations which claim to revere the city's sanctity. Only two or three days ago I read in the newspapers that Israel's Government had agreed to the demilitarization of the Old City of Jerusalem. I would like to know if this indicates acceptance of a situation in which one part of the Holy City is recognized by all parties as a demilitarized zone while the other is exposed, day and night, to a hail of bombs. It seems to us that we are attempting to protect only that section of the Old City which interests Europe and America...

I want to know whether the Government of Israel is prepared to fix a demarcation line in Jerusalem? The entire city is holy to us. We cannot accept that all of a sudden, after most of our synagogues and houses of learning have been destroyed, the sanctity of the Old City is remembered and its bombardment forbidden, while at the same time the rest of Jewish Jerusalem is open to fire from the sixty cannon surrounding the city.

Not only did we feel forgotten, we also felt discriminated against by the Government of Israel. We feel that this war is our collective war. Every young man who came to us and helped defend Jerusalem raised the spirits of us all. We felt that this was not the war of the residents of Jerusalem alone, but of all of us. Therefore, I would like to know where this discrimination in the field of mobilization originated. We are already recruiting men of 45, whereas in Tel Aviv men of 41 are being drafted only now. If the mobilization of older people is necessary, it must be general policy throughout the country.

We suffered from something else, and this may perhaps have weighed most heavily on us. We were kept in the dark....This must be corrected in future. No matter who the military commander is, he must be in close contact with the civilian leadership. I want to see a change in this sphere and the appropriate orders given.

One of the chief objectives must be to raise the spirits of the inhabitants of Jerusalem. They need support. The courage with which they bore great suffering has already been mentioned. I, too, praise the fortitude of the residents of Jerusalem. But they are, nonetheless, in need of political and spiritual support. I will not make concrete suggestions at this point. But if it were possible to hold the forthcoming meeting of the Zionist Executive in Jerusalem this would be a great encouragement, serving as proof of the fact that we have not given up the idea of Jerusalem as our capital. There is a need for a ceremonial act to show the people of Jerusalem that they do not live in some remote corner, but rather at the center of the nation. Our Sages of blessed memory say that the inhabitants of Jerusalem are the guards of the palace of the King of Kings. I wish the view that the inhabitants of Jerusalem guard the palace of the entire nation would penetrate every corner of the state and the diaspora. Our brethren in the diaspora know that those who live in

Jerusalem guarded it for the sake of the nation. Therefore, everyone must aid and support the city.

E. Dobkin (Jerusalem): May I suggest that the Council of State appoint a small committee of four or five members which, together with the committee appointed by the Government, will discuss all Jewish Jerusalem's weighty problems on a more practical level. It will have to meet frequently and make concrete decisions.

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion; Where?

E. Dobkin (Jerusalem): In Tel Aviv, at the center of action. The issues which have been raised...concerning Jerusalem's fate should not be discussed in so large a forum. They pertain to both the military and economic aspects of Jerusalem. Therefore, I do not believe that this debate can be fruitful. A discussion must be held, however, as none of the basic arrangements regarding Jerusalem have yet been made.

I returned from Jerusalem today and feel obliged to tell you that only yesterday, after two weeks of truce, the first tomato reached the city. There is no transportation system, fuel or electricity yet, and it is hoped that these will be available by Monday. As to the mood of the inhabitants, when I mentioned this in a different forum someone suggested psychoanalysis to examine what happened to the Jews of Jerusalem, since their feelings seem identical to those experienced in the Warsaw Ghetto. There is no point in assuming this identity of emotions, but nonetheless, Jerusalem's problems must be tackled.

M. Wilner (Communists): There is little point in speaking of the other side of the coin at present, but I do want to emphasize the fact that another side exists. In reporting on Jerusalem, my colleagues have described the heroism of the Jewish population, as well as the somewhat different mood of a significant portion of the city's residents. Despite the suffering, Jerusalem appears to have been the scene of heroic deeds. We must view Jerusalem as part a *de facto* part of the State of Israel. On military and other questions, our policy on Jerusalem must be the same as it would be with regard to any part of the State of Israel, though a part subject to much harsher conditions.

I would like to emphasize the fact that none of the places holy to Christianity in Jerusalem were damaged. Churches are not holy to them. Oil wells and strategic bases are their holy sites. Therefore, there is no sense in appealing to Truman, Marshall or any of the other war criminals. Had Truman wanted to, he could have prevented what happened in Jerusalem, and at least implemented the U.N. resolutions. What happened in Jerusalem must teach us that the current leadership of America and England is no friend of the Jewish world, unless the Jews are willing to accept any criminal act not only against the Jews but against all humanity....

Jerusalem was not only the battlefield of the State of Israel, it was also the front that saved Tel Aviv. This must be brought home to the residents of Tel Aviv. The enemy forces were massed around Jerusalem. It is incomprehensible, therefore, that we conceded the alternative road to Jerusalem....We have heard from Council Member Dobkin that supplies to Jerusalem have not improved during the two weeks of the truce. I believe that this is due to the fact that the road to Jerusalem is under the supervision of observers ostensibly sent by the U.N. but in fact American. The way we tend to accept everything the Americans say is one of the reasons for Jerusalem's suffering and the fact that the situation has not improved during the truce.

The current problem is Jerusalem, but in effect it is a general one. A basic change in Jerusalem's status depends on a change in Government policy as regards requesting aid, establishing friendly relations with those who extend their hand to us and putting a stop to proclamations of our special connection with the West, and the U.S. in particular...which harm our war effort. Our orientation must be towards those who help us in concrete terms and are prepared to extend us political and military aid.

B. Repetor (Mapam): In all probability, had the Government reported to us on its activities regarding Jerusalem, we would have saved ourselves this discussion. I understand, however, that the Government had good reasons for not doing so, and I will not argue with this. The Council did well to hear what its representatives from Jerusalem had to say, which was important for both Jerusalem and the Council. Following the remarks made here, I think we should make several decisions concerning the Government's activities in the field of supplies, transportation, a centralized settlement authority, etc. This should not be postponed, and action should be taken promptly. I propose the following:

A. The Government should apprise the Council of all the issues relating to past military and civilian action in Jerusalem, so that it can discuss them. The Government should also prepare a resolution for the forthcoming Council sitting.

B. The Government should set up a special mechanism for increasing the efficiency of transportation, supplies, equipment and any other essential matter during the truce.

C. The Government should appoint a special committee in Tel Aviv to deal with Jerusalem's...financial and economic problems, construction and defense....

D. The Government should discuss the political future and character of the city immediately, presenting its conclusions to the Council of State.

E. A special financial source should be found to alleviate Jerusalem's most pressing needs and build it up in the future. The Govern-

ment should work towards this objective and inform the Council of its progress.

It is evident that Jerusalem's affairs cannot be left to its 90,000 Jewish inhabitants alone. Taking this political reality into consideration, the Government of Israel must deal with the problems, regardless of the city's political status. Only if the Provisional Government actually deals with Jerusalem will we be able to demand that its Jewish population refrain from leaving, continue to resist hostilities and work to rebuild the city.

The Minister of Agriculture, A. Zisling: Jerusalem was not abandoned as far as emotional support was concerned, although this partnership of emotion may have been imperfect. Though we were aware of what was happening in Jerusalem, feelings are deeper when one is actively involved....Our help was extended with great feeling, though perhaps not with complete success. Clearly, there were both successes and failures. The subject of Jerusalem has been raised not in order to discuss betrayal by the Jews but rather by those who fired shells and, particularly, those who trained and armed them—Britain and its allies. The blood of those who fell for Jerusalem cries out against them....

I agree with Rabbi Berlin's political remarks. Jerusalem is a Jewish city. We protect its Jewishness by recognizing and caring about its character and preventing an approach which is contrary to ours from gaining the upper hand. Jewish Jerusalem will be secure only if a series of settlements are created around it. The corridor to Jerusalem must be settled. The city must also remain Jewish within a framework of international rule. This, in my view, is a better solution than the illusion of a sovereign Jerusalem, which could not be secured under Abdullah, Britain's faithful servant.

I accept what Mr. Ben-Zvi and others have said, but I do not think that Mr. Dobkin's suggestions should be implemented. There is no need for another general committee for Jerusalem. Perhaps one person should be appointed to devote himself to the subject. Jerusalem needs an exceptional civilian political authority, in addition to the military authority. The two need not necessarily be at odds, and could strengthen and complement one another. This should not be restricted to Jerusalem only. The management of military affairs should be interwoven with managing the political affairs of the Yishuv as a whole. If this is not done, both sides are weakened. Jerusalem must be strengthened to the maximum of our abilities. A great deal of effort has already been invested, and this must be augmented by the authorities. People should not be moved from Jerusalem, thereby emptying the city. On the contrary, its population should be increased and the Yishuv within the city and its environs strengthened. We must not institute a system of "hostages," however. Jerusalem must grow, not wither, but if someone is vitally needed elsewhere his specific case should be considered by the local in-

stitutions. Furthermore, if it is decided that he is needed and should leave Jerusalem, his family should not be held hostage there.

We must help Jerusalem. We must strengthen mutual aid all over the country. Poverty has been mentioned, but the degree of suffering of day laborers and others in comparison with those who have means has not yet been fully appreciated. People who had means may not have set aside anything to ease the suffering of others. Even today Jerusalem can still help itself. There is great wealth in the city which was not made available to the Army. This probably also applies to people outside Jerusalem, throughout the entire country, and must be remembered as we implement our future plans. The Municipalities of Tel Aviv, Haifa and other towns...should regard themselves as being privileged to aid Jerusalem....

Jerusalem needs water, and Tel Aviv could guarantee a loan and arrangements to secure a better water supply than is presently available. Haifa, as well as other places which suffered less than Jerusalem, could offer specific aid, in addition to the help given by the Government. The Government must make detailed recommendations for a course of action, and submit them...to the center of Jewish life and the Yishuv in Israel. Whatever the legal form our position may take, Jerusalem belongs to the State of Israel.

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: The need of our colleagues from Jerusalem to say what is on their minds is understandable. Whether they expressed it in the proper manner is a different question. I agree with Council Member Katznelson's remark that it was a privilege to have lived in Jerusalem at that time. Most of us did not have that privilege. But the claim that Jerusalem was discriminated against is not true and deprives the hundreds and thousands who were killed or wounded fighting for Jerusalem of their due. Judging by their speeches, our colleagues from Jerusalem do not seem to realize that. The basic problem of Jerusalem is not one of arrangements and provisions, nor is it a political issue. It is rather a question of military capability, of whether we will have the strength, first, to conquer the Old City, secondly, to conquer a sufficiently wide corridor from here to Jerusalem...and, thirdly, to defeat the Arab Legion in the Triangle. Without these three things we cannot honestly say that Jerusalem has been liberated or that the danger threatening it has been averted.

Although securing the integrity of Jerusalem is a primary objective of these actions, the actual battlefronts are largely outside the city. Anyone who had the privilege of living in Jerusalem then should not ignore or belittle the importance of these actions. Military strength alone will not solve all Jerusalem's problems. Once our forces liberate the heart of Jerusalem, the Old City, conquer the areas between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem which are not yet in our hands, and defeat the Legion, a major economic question will arise, namely, how are we to secure a

healthy and expanding economic basis for the inhabitants of Jerusalem as well as for the influx of people into the city? The third problem...is how to supply large quantities of water, fuel, food and materials to Jerusalem while the truce lasts.

These are the three major problems concerning Jerusalem. As for the problem which agitated the Members so much, the internal arrangements, I can only say that whatever arrangement was made was not accepted by Jerusalem. When a single person was appointed an appeal was made. When a committee was appointed an appeal was made. If we set up a Civil Government there will be another appeal. I am not accusing the representatives of Jerusalem. The inhabitants of Jerusalem are extraordinary and I fear that no organizational arrangement will satisfy them, especially as long as we do not control the Old City and the road to Jerusalem, and as long as the enemy can shell the city.

The Government is faced with the dilemma of whether to appoint a Governor of Jerusalem. There is clearly a need for this, but, as usual, it is difficult to implement. If only there were a wise man among us who could come up with a suggestion acceptable to all the people of Jerusalem.

Some things have been accomplished. If, despite shortages and shelling, there was a minimum...of food, this is thanks not only to those outside the city who organized food consignments, but also to the people of Jerusalem. I will not name all those who organized the distribution of food with such ability, devotion and loyalty, but they should be praised. We should not resent the fact that our colleagues from Jerusalem did not make any constructive recommendations. Suggesting that a committee be formed cannot be regarded as constructive advice. At present, our chief objective must be to undertake serious military action to conquer the open area along the road to Jerusalem and liberate the city completely. I hope that this will be done.

The economic development of Jerusalem must be dealt with. Dr. Granowsky is head of the Jerusalem Company, among whose primary functions is the economic revival of the city. This includes bolstering the University and, as far as possible, moving all educational institutions to Jerusalem, regardless of what the city's status may be. Education and culture are "industries" which belong in Jerusalem. Jewish science, culture and art must all meet in Jerusalem, but the organizational problems are difficult to solve. To appoint a Governor of Jerusalem or set up a communal institution there which will be acceptable to all the various circles is no mean feat....In general, Jews accept authority only reluctantly, and in Jerusalem they are even less inclined to do so.

At present, our greatest concern is to maximalize the stocks of supplies for Jerusalem. Whenever they come here, the Members from Jerusalem should remind us, make demands, urge us on and help us.

No stocks can be too large. If fighting breaks out again we cannot let Jerusalem find itself once again in the same situation as at the time of the proclamation of our independence and the subsequent invasion.

Colleagues visiting Jerusalem must tell its Jewish population that it has not been forgotten....There are thousands of young people willing to give their lives for Jerusalem's liberation and redemption. The Holy City is unlucky. King David chose one of the most problematic spots in the country as his capital. The people who returned to Zion in our generation did not concern themselves with creating countrywide links between settled areas and the capital. By a miracle, a Jewish majority was preserved in Jerusalem, and even grew in our time. But a Jewish majority within the city is not enough. Jewish agriculture surrounding the city is necessary, as is a passage to Jerusalem, bolstered on both sides by Jewish settlements. We are now paying for our mistakes. Thus, by means of war we must correct the damage caused by negligence in times of peace. The capacity to correct this lies solely in the hands of our Army, and I hope it will succeed. The process has already begun. We control a passage, but at present it is too narrow. It must be broadened to the north and the south, and agricultural-military settlements must be positioned along it. This can be done for the sake of more peaceful days, and if our efforts are increased they will surely bear fruit.

Our military strength is vital for our existence and our future. Because of its geographical position, Jerusalem's destiny rests more on our military strength than any other place. Jerusalem's salvation depends on recapturing the road to the city, an operation which entails building it as well. Both conquest and construction require a strong fighting and settling force. At present we cannot discuss everything here, even if subjects are not made public. In times of war many issues must be kept under wraps. We must not further aggravate our situation; what we must do is increase the numbers of our fighting men.

I do not understand why the inhabitants of Jerusalem resent the mobilization of men up to the age of 45. The country was also in need of a workforce. Jerusalem required supplies, all of which came from outside the city. Supplies have to be produced, stored, assembled, loaded and transported. Many settlements in the country, as well as numerous craftsmen, laborers, farmers, drivers, mechanics, transporters, etc., participated in this effort for Jerusalem. All Israel was concerned for Jerusalem's economic situation. But we do not want Israel's economy to function only because of diaspora Jewry. There is a need for production and labor, for agriculture, industry and transportation, for construction and seaports. It is our task to sustain the economy. If we want to do this we cannot possibly mobilize all our manpower for the war effort alone. Jerusalem was capable of mobilizing more people in its defense and fortification, and this does not constitute discrimination. We must not present the subject of Jerusalem in contradistinction to the rest of the

country, nor vice versa. We all share a common struggle. Jerusalem suffered more than most of Israel's other settlements, but I would not want to deprive settlements in the Jordan Valley, Upper Galilee, the Negev, the Plain or anywhere else of the credit due to them. They, too, faced suffering, death and destruction, and shared a heroism which will always be remembered with the utmost respect.

The test is not over, and the time has not yet come for the distribution of prizes. There is still a need for an allout spiritual, physical, economic and military effort. Our work is far from perfect. Let us correct our mistakes by means of a shared effort rather than through mutual provocation.

A. Katznelson (Jerusalem): The last time I left Tel Aviv for Jerusalem the Prime Minister told me that the proclamation of Jerusalem as a demilitarized city was being contemplated. He informed me that we had two objectives: to open the road as soon as possible and to defend the agricultural settlements around Jerusalem, but that these contradicted another plan—the demilitarization of Jerusalem. The situation has changed since then. We have paid the price for opening the road, though, of course, Jerusalem would have been worth even more. We have also paid the price for defending our agricultural villages around Jerusalem.

Some days ago I heard from the Prime Minister about the sixty cannon of the Arab armies surrounding Jerusalem. I will not make a military prognosis. I prefer to be optimistic. But in a situation of this kind it is absolutely impossible to run the affairs of Jerusalem, not just strategic questions, from Tel Aviv; just as it is impossible to run the affairs of the entire Jewish state from Jerusalem. This is the reality, and my suggestion is a simple one: there should be no Jerusalem Committee in Tel Aviv. Instead, all the members of the Ministerial Committee should come to Jerusalem for two or three days and discuss things on the spot. The people of Jerusalem must be made to feel that their affairs are being directed by their own representatives, not that they have to wait for a telegram from Tel Aviv which may or may not arrive.

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: There is no need to discuss whether members of the Jerusalem Committee will go to Jerusalem. The Foreign Minister will reply on the demilitarization of Jerusalem.

The Foreign Minister, M. Shertok: I suggest that Mr. Warhaftig refrain from accepting everything he reads in the papers as the truth, thereby sparing himself doubts and agitation. A note of inquiry can be sent to the appropriate Minister. There is no need to save questions for the sittings of the Council of State.

I cannot imagine that any member of the Government would deal with proposals on the demilitarization of Jerusalem without consulting the Foreign Ministry. My Ministry knows nothing about the demilita-

rization of the Old City of Jerusalem. Not that there have not been any such suggestions, but the Foreign Ministry has not received them. I do not know who proposed this. It is completely false. This is the answer to the factual question.

What I do know is that in the circles of the U.N. Mediator the idea has been mooted that if his mission on the major issues fails, he may try merely...to achieve the demilitarization of Jerusalem. The idea is not to demilitarize only the Old City in relation to all Jerusalem, but to demilitarize all Jerusalem in relation to the entire country. That is quite different. To date, there have been no concrete proposals, discussions or negotiations on this subject. I am not even certain to what extent this suggestion is realistic. First, the withdrawal of the Arab Legion from Jerusalem must be demanded. Only then could one discuss the internal demilitarization of the city. If a proposal of this kind were to be made seriously, the Provisional Government, in consultation with the people of Jerusalem, could discuss it and reach a decision. But no such proposal has been made.

The Prime Minister, D. Ben-Gurion: As whether Jerusalem is part of the state or not, I would like to say that at the moment there are areas borders acceptable to all sides are fix with international approval, we are talking about the boundaries of Jewish government. Jerusalem within them (though, to my great sorrow, without the Old City at present), just as Tel Aviv is. There is no different between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv or between Haifa and Hanita. They are all within the boundaries of Jewish government.