PALESTINIAN SECURITY PLAN

Objective

To encourage and enable the Palestinian Authority (PA) fully to meet its security obligations under Phase 1 of the Roadmap.

Current Situation

Recent developments suggest a real opportunity to revive the peace process, starting with security steps by the PA. They include :

• progress in Egyptian-led efforts to achieve a new, sustained ceasefire by the rejectionists;
• the public questioning by senior Israeli security personnel of the efficacy of current tactics; and Israeli government interest in renewed direct contacts with the PA on security issues;
• the Abu Ala government's acceptance of its roadmap obligation to take action to prevent attacks; and
• positive Palestinian response to UK proposals for an intensive, short-term security drive to address Israeli and US preconditions for re-engagement.

The key to progress and a reconnection with the Roadmap is a two-stage security plan : a first stage of 2-3 months focussing exclusively on Palestinian action; a second stage of about 6 months requiring action by both Israel and the PA to implement roadmap obligations. The two phases will be announced prior to implementation.

Phase One

Phase 1 would consist of :

• a short term security drive on :
    • suicide bombers;
    • illegal arms collection;
    • Qassam rockets;
    • terror finance; and
    • closing arms smuggling tunnels into Gaza.

• an intra-Palestinian ceasefire

• reinvigorated civil policing to restore law and order.

The security drive, ceasefire and civil policing would ideally run in parallel and would then be mutually reinforcing. But they are designed to operate independently. In particular, we judge that the security drive can be

implemented unilaterally, ie with no reciprocal action or support from Israel, and in the absence of a ceasefire.

The PA must have a sense of ownership of the Phase 1 security plan, but the plan will not work unless it is seen to be devised and monitored independently. So the process would be: Phase 1 plan formed by the US/UK; buy-in by the Quartet; then buy-in by the PA; with a public announcement in January 2004.

The UK is already working with trusted PA contacts to have a <u>security drive</u> drawing on UK input adopted by the PA leadership, and to put in place the structures required for its successful implementation. <u>Details are at Annex A</u>. The Palestinians' performance would be verified by the US/UK; we would ask Israel to judge it on results.

Egypt (Suleiman) has been working to establish a sustained <u>intra-Palestinian ceasefire</u>. The US, UK and Quartet could most usefully back Egyptian activity by offering political support and by delivering Israeli restraint. We want an indefinite ceasefire but should accept one which is time-limited but which would take us into Phase Two (below).

More active <u>Palestinian civil policing</u> would enhance public order in PA controlled areas, and so further constrain the rejectionists, and show the Palestinian public that PA security action benefits them too. This activity is long-term and will run on into Phase Two. International assistance is needed with equipment and training. EU and other states are likely to be willing to provide finance and equipment, but will not do so immediately. They will wish to see an improvement in the wider security situation offering some assurance that the IDF will not again destroy new resources provided, as they did during Defensive Shield. EU member states may be able to provide know-how and training without this delay.

Phase One should also include <u>pressure from the international community on the PA</u> to ensure that all security personnel are paid through its accounts and not in cash by Arafat; and <u>planning for the work to be taken forward in Phase Two</u>, including preparation for co-ordinated international assistance to civil policing efforts, and scoping work for restructuring and training of Palestinian security services (eg an audit of current capabilities).

We should demarche Syria, Iran and others at the beginning of Phase 1 to co-operate in curbing terrorist activity.

Phase Two

This Palestinian action cannot be sustained indefinitely without Israeli reciprocation – and a return to roadmap implementation. A second phase of activity, lasting about six months, would require both Israeli and Palestinian action. It should be set out in public commitments by the PA to the international community, and have <u>five objectives</u>:

(1)   The restoration of systematic <u>security cooperation</u> between Israeli and Palestinian agencies.   This will require US facilitation, along the lines of the Wolf input, but more sustained. The UK is willing to play a part.

(2) <u>Degrading the capabilities of the rejectionists</u> – Hamas, PIJ and the Al Aqsa Brigades – through the disruption of their leaderships' communications and command and control capabilities; the detention of key middle-ranking officers; and the confiscation of their arsenals and financial resources held within the Occupied Territories. US and – informally – UK monitors would report both to Israel and to the Quartet. We could also explore the temporary internment of leading Hamas and PIJ figures, making sure they are well-treated, with EU funding.

(3) Restoration of <u>PA control of the streets</u> through civil policing throughout PA-controlled areas. This would involve the deployment of armed and uniformed officers; their re-equipment by the international community with telephones, radios, vehicles and buildings, including detention facilities; and training (eg in public order policing). Assistance must be co-ordinated to prevent duplication (eg donation of incompatible equipment); and linked to activity on judicial reform.

Phase I

(4) The progressive <u>withdrawal of the IDF</u> from Palestinian population centres, with simultaneous PA backfilling. To be US-supervised.

(5)   Palestinian action to <u>consolidate PA security forces</u> in accordance with Roadmap requirements. The Egyptian and Jordanian involvement in retraining etc envisaged in the Roadmap should be reinvigorated under this rubric.

A range of countries (US, European, Arab and others) can contribute to achieving objectives 2, 3 and 5. A <u>security assistance conference </u>(which the UK could host) could be used to maximise support and demonstrate publicly the international community's determination to address the security issue.

Comprehensive process

Phase I ++

The key to the success of all these elements is an improving political, economic and security environment for the Palestinians. This will reduce Hamas' and PIJ's popularity and enhance the ability of the PA to take them on. The Roadmap sets out most of the key requirements of Israel; an end to 'deportations, attacks on civilians, confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and property... (and) destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure'. To these we would add assassinations and construction of the wall/fence within the Occupied Territories. An improvement in the security situation should be used to press Israel to suspend measures which in practice either fuel violence or undermine the basis for a two-state solution.

Phase Two should also include renewed public statements by the two leaderships at its outset on violence and incitement, in accordance with Roadmap Phase 1 requirements

Performance benchmarks

Effort will be as important as success in judging Palestinian performance and securing an Israeli response. A complete end to suicide bombing cannot be guaranteed, but all efforts must be made to prevent attacks. A full set of performance benchmarks for Phase Two will be developed, but these would include :

- Shared intelligence-based assessment of pressure felt by Hamas and other rejectionist groups;
- Assessment of extent to which such Palestinian attacks as do occur are 'freelance', or commissioned by rejectionist groups;
- Evidence of PA leadership covertly reneging, or not, on their commitment to implement the security plan;
- Increased visibility of civil police through uniformed presence and patrolling;
- Satisfactory legal framework governing police activity
- Clear roles and responsibilities and chains of command (internally and with relation to other security agencies)
- Community policing initiatives, including extension of policing into camps
- Hamas' popularity, as measured in opinion polls.

grass-root initiative

Roles of external parties

This plan is based on an acceptance of the <u>US</u> precondition for re-engagement of unilateral Palestinian action on security. In Phase Two it envisages three principal roles for the US; encouragement to Israel to resume security cooperation with the PA, and to refrain from actions which will make the PA's task unmanageable, and the verification of the PA's performance (building on Phase 1 verification described in Annex A).

US Role
1. encourage Israel resume cooperat
2. refrain from actions
3. verification of PA's performance

The <u>Quartet's</u> initial role will be to press the Arab states to move aggressively against Hamas funders and infrastructure on their territory in the context of a renewed international security effort. In Phase Two, it should begin publicly to monitor the compliance of the parties with their Roadmap obligations, receiving data from US, UN and European personnel on the ground.

Outside the context of PA obligations

The <u>EU</u> can provide both infrastructure and training to PA civil police focused on maintaining order in PA controlled-areas, finance for security sector salaries and help for the central intelligence capacity set out in Annex A. In Phase 2 the EU should help fund infrastructure beyond the security sector. The EU can also act as a clearing house for PA requests for material support, to avoid duplication of effort. <u>EU countries</u> can also contribute to monitoring progress on the PA's non-security reform commitments, and use EU financial leverage to help maintain momentum on reform.

The <u>UK</u> is already encouraging PA action on Phase 1 issues, and is willing to remain involved in monitoring and mentoring the PA. The UK stands ready to

set up a special unit to help take forward the plan, working on political, security and diplomatic fronts.

Egypt is the only outside party able to play a decisive role in achieving an intra-Palestinian ceasefire. Egypt and Jordan can help too in retraining and reorganising the PA security forces, as they began to do in the spring/summer.

Other states (eg Japan, Australia etc) may be willing to assist with verification (on security, where the nationality is acceptable to Israel, or other roadmap issues), and assistance eg to civil police.

ANNEX A

AIM

To enable the Palestinian security services to demonstrate improvements in the security situation within the next two to three months in specific areas, taking into account their diminished capabilities and the fact that the Israelis may provide no help in the early stages. This is to be achieved by drawing up a short-term security plan which is achievable, realistic and that can, at the outset, secure Palestinian Authority buy-in.

The plan is not dependent on a parallel ceasefire. But its objectives will be better achieved if Egyptian attempts to broker a sustained *hudna* succeed. It should make the resumption of terrorist violence at the end of any such ceasefire significantly more difficult to achieve.

DETAIL

1.   SUICIDE BOMBERS

Objective: To reduce the number of attempted suicide bombings without, in this initial phase, taking on directly the rejectionist groups organising them.

-    Set up a central operations room in Ramallah to identify and track suicide bombers, to be manned 24/7 with advertised telephone numbers, with direct lines to the Israelis to provide them with immediate threat intelligence.

-    Act on usable intelligence to disrupt attacks and apprehend those planning/implementing them.

-    A 3-month campaign to disarm the AL Aqsa Brigades and to begin disrupting the command and control of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

-    Action by the PA to stop the flow of money from Iran/Hizbullah to finance suicide operations.

-    A PA campaign to locate and destroy explosives laboratories in the West Bank.

2.   TUNNELS

Objective: Significantly to reduce the quantity of arms held by the rejectionist groups, in tandem with objectives 4 and 5.

-    Set up a team in Rafah working only on tunnels, and reporting daily to the operations room in Ramallah.

-    Arrest and put on trial the smugglers who run the tunnels, and freeze the assets of those who benefit from the traffic. Without tackling those who run the tunnels, destroying them will be ineffective, as they will simply be rebuilt.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. TERRORIST FINANCE

Objective: To choke off the flow of funds to the rejectionist groups.

- Enforce a system to compel bureaux de change in the OTs to report all transactions over USD 5000 to the Palestinian Monetary Authority.

- Build up the PA's capabilities to monitor financial inflows to the OTs from abroad (electronic database, software analysis tools).

- Tighten supervision of charitable organisations, including the 1700 NGOs working in the OTs.

- Mount high profile raids of prominent money changers suspected of continued links to terrorist groups.

4. QASSAM ROCKETS

Objective: To reduce attacks by seizing munitions and disrupting planned operations.

- Establish a multi-service unit in Gaza focussing solely on collecting and using intelligence on Qassam attacks, reporting daily to the central operations room and having direct links with the Israelis.

- Set up a quick response unit with bomb disposal capability to be ready at all times to go to an area where possible Qassam activity has been reported.

- Improve and extend National Security checkpoints in Gaza around areas used for Qassam attacks, to provide 24/7 searching of vehicles entering the area.

5. WEAPONS COLLECTION

Objective: Significantly to reduce the quantity of arms held by the rejectionist groups, in tandem with objectives 2 and 4.

- Set up multi-service teams in Gaza and West Bank to locate and destroy arms caches, with lines to the Israelis.

- Announce an amnesty to encourage voluntary handover of weapons.

- Establish checkpoints on the street to search vehicles and people for unlicensed weapons.

VERIFICATION

Progress could be verified by a small team of UK/US personnel with security and intelligence backgrounds visiting the thematic multi-service teams to observe operations.

END

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