

Permanent Status Negotiations

18 September 2000, 12 pm

King David Hotel, Jerusalem

Attendees:

Palestinian:

Dr. Saeb Ereikat

Col. Mohammad Dahlan

Omar Dajani

Israeli:

Gilad Sher

Israel Hassoon

Gidi Gridstein

Minutes:

Meeting commenced 12:45 pm

GS: You have the floor. Do you want to address another issue?

SE: We have some suggestions regarding the presentation yesterday.

GS: Suggestions or comments?

SE: Both. Mohammad will give our presentation.

MD: I listened to what Gilad said yesterday and decided not to be provoked by it – though I'm not sure why you presented something so provocative. When I saw Gilad in NYC, I had a rebirth of hope, and I believe that we can do something here.

What surprised me in your presentation was the way you conceptualized what you want. It's based on the redeployment of the Israeli forces – redrafting Israeli control over the Palestinians. You are also seeking to continue your mandate over the Palestinians. I didn't detect that you want to move from the Interim mentality to the permanent status mentality. Under your approach, you're offering a few dark corridors, which, if entered, will pull us deeper and deeper into darkness. I looked through your agreement with Egypt, which did not involve all this. The threat to Israel from Egypt at the time was from all Arab countries. The PLO and Israel are now working together. Our strategic thinking is that we move from the hostility stage to friendship. And we've really witnessed a change in 90% of the Palestinian people. I see it in the streets, in the business community, the people in the PA. Our interests are tied, whether we like it or not. We have confronted a certain segment of the Palestinian society, and we were victorious. Hamas and a

number groups against the agreement have become paralyzed. Their position outside and inside is weakening day to day. We don't want to witness a rebirth – a new life – for them. Your suggestions are based on the past and weaken what we aspire to reach with you. Why do you see the external threats directed only towards Israel? Why don't you see that these threats are also directed against the Pal. state? Let's look at our mutual interests – not a vision in which the Pal's are servants of Israel. If I looked at your suggestions as a newcomer to the negotiations, I would understand certain fears: I don't see the real interests and objectives reflected in what you suggest. 200 or 400 Israeli soldiers in the JV; I can't comprehend what they'll do for the Israeli state. For even the countries that are hostile to you – we're the buffer zone. Plus the peace agreement will produce a peaceful situation in the area if we reach a comprehensive, peaceful agreement with you. There will not be incentives for states like Iran to attack you. And if they attack you, they'll be attacking us.

Let me review some of the points you suggested. Regarding the preamble, etc., I leave it Saeb.

Both sides are committed to fight terror. We're serious about it; we've been doing it even now, when we're weak. We know the serious choices we have to make, and we never pulled back from this commitment, even during times of crisis with you. We have never made it a bargaining point – even during Netanyahu. And we've told Hamas that if they even think about terrorist activities after the agreement, we will crush them. They have the right to struggle through other means – but not violence. We've made that clear.

Regarding the demilitarized state, I don't want anyone to misinterpret what I say, because I've been hurt in the Palestinian street by Shlomo and Gilad's words. I hope that won't happen again. I understand that you don't want a militarized state that can attack Israel or assist others in attacking Israel. But we cannot accept the phrase "demilitarized state". I suggested a state with "limited arms" or "defensive arms." Without using the phrase, we can reach an acceptable agreement. I don't want anything that sounds like the Interim – counting of bullets, etc. "Weak police force", etc. . . . You tell us that you will view us as a State, but you don't want us to become a mockery. When you mention the Pal. ground and maritime forces, you don't mention air force. We don't want fighter planes – F15s and F16s or any planes that carry rockets that some crazy person will fire. We have needs for planes that can confront terror, for transportation, movement of the President and visitors. We should have an air force without fighter planes.

Gilad said that he wants to specify the nature of the Pal police force. I believe that armaments will be an important subject for us, based on the concept of a state with limited or defensive arms. As far as the numbers, though, why does that concern you? The numbers will be a Palestinian matter.

GS: Numbers of what? Manpower?

SE: Yes

MD: But we don't want an army that will be a burden on the Pal. budget – 1 million men employed. The nature of these forces – it should be a force the main objective of which will be to defend the Pal. state internally. Let me be very clear – regarding the composition, the number, etc. will reflect only the strength of the Palestinian state. We're sure that we'll have some internal and external problems after the establishment of the State. The external threat won't come from other countries – no Arab state will think of occupying us – but there are other forces that may use Palestinian factions to stir internal problems or to collude to change the kind of regime we have in Palestine. Hizbullah is a perfect example. I don't Hizbullah is planning to attack you from N. Lebanon, but they may think about destabilizing us or to beef up the military capabilities of Jihad. We have many examples of them trying to hurt the PA. They tried to take over in 1995 – during which 13 of them were killed.

Regarding the armaments of Palestine: the arms of the Pal. state will be only the arms for the security forces. We will not allow parties to bear them – any kind of arms, light or heavy. You're trying to condition me. I agree with you that the arms will only be for the state and legitimate forces. What about our concerns regarding the arms of the settlers, who will be remaining for a while. Even though they'll be annexed, they'll be in the heart of our territories. And we have had terrible problems with the settlers.

Let me move to the JV and the specified zones and locations you suggested for the redeployment of Israeli forces.

IH: No. In the Jordan Valley, there's a difference between the presence and locations.

MD: I understand that. I agree to the presence of an international force during an agreed time – a strong one -- we can really beef it up. And part of the coordination can report to you. This can provide for your interests and our interests. And let's talk about a phased withdrawal – a short time – during which we can replace your forces with the international forces. As far as the entry of foreign forces into Palestine and building bases for them in Palestine. Suppose that tomorrow we're under a threat, and we decide to ask Americans to come, is that general principle going to apply.

And I don't understand how having Palestinian forces outside of our territory affects your security. If we have an agreement regarding our armaments, the name, etc., what difference does it make if we have a few thousand forces in Africa, Bosnia, etc. Why do you want to prevent us from improving our worldwide image?

Regarding military/security alliances with others, we have the Arab League, which we are part of as Arabs. If the Arab League wants to send forces somewhere and include symbolic Palestinian forces, what's the problem? During the Gulf War, the Saudis asked us to send our flag with a soldier so that we can say that Palestine has joined the alliance. Arafat refused.

IH: Yaser Arafat had to – he didn't have an army. He had only the "sulda," no state.

SE: We addressed this issue in our draft – military alliances directed against each other. If it's an alliance against Israel, I understood. But sending our troops to Sierra Leone, why is that problematic?

MD: We need to liberate ourselves – and not only from you. Regarding the limitations on importation and production of weapons, I understand it. But I don't understand how if something goes wrong with the armaments we're allowed, why shouldn't I be able to manufacture a replacement.

Regarding the EWS, you say three, I say two. We will agree on the arrangements for the entry of your personnel, their passage, etc. But how long do you want these stations? I want a timeline.

Regarding the EM sphere, you use a phrase which I don't like – that you'll take care of my commercial needs. I'm talking about my rights. Give me your security concerns, and let's discuss it. The EM sphere and our skies will be under our sovereignty and control. I'm not seeking to accommodate my needs, I'm seeking to accommodate my rights. Let the technical experts of both sides deal with these issues in coordination.

As far as the time period agreed for the settlers to be removed, their entry, etc. We're prepared to take all necessary measures to ensure their protection and to avoid friction during the specified period before they depart, but you have to keep in mind that this will be arrangements under Pal. sovereignty with full coordination with the Israeli army.

We have no objections to monitoring and verification -- and to choose the countries, etc. . . . ?

As far as the planning and zoning for the EW stations, this is the first time you say this. You said before that they would be at the top of mountains, and would not obstruct Pal. life. We're not going to construct an antenna to obstruct you

As far as security coordination for settlements, confronting terror, we can specify the necessary functions.

Thank you very much.

IH: Thank you very much, Mr. Dahlan.

SE: Can I add a few things to what Mohammad said? I want to have a meaningful endeavor today with you. I thought to myself: when someone tells me that the Americans are preparing a package, why would Barak or Arafat if they hear this concentrate on this task while the superpower is preparing a package? That's legitimate. As Mohammad said, regarding the 15 minutes in NY, if something is going to be solved, it will be solved here.

GS: It was 15 minutes because you smoked in the room!

SE: I listen to the security conversations even though I've never put a gun in my hand – and am proud of it – and I see Israel's concerns. I understand Israel's nature – the history of Israelis in the region – 5 wars in 50 years. It's not a bright history – fro you for us, the Arabs. So when I hear you and Mike Herzog express these concerns, I'm not undermining your concerns. We're here as part of a process to ease the insecurities for you and your people. There are risks for you and risks for us. To cut a long story short, I said to you Gilad in NY, let's marry the phased withdrawal with a phased entry of international forces. I'm an Arab. I'm not going to change – my sons names are Mohammad and Ali, and their sons will be named Saeb and _____. Strategically speaking, if the concern is that Israel will be threatened from the East, which is the basis for all of these zones and arrangements, I'm faced with a dilemma. I cannot stop being an Arab in time of war, but I cannot be allies with those Arabs who would attack Israel. I am compelled here to undertake an obligation that this territory will not be used by Arabs or Muslims against Israel. This is my dilemma

We've agreed that we'll work together to promote a region free of hostile alliances, etc. I told you that I was willing not to enter into any military alliances hostile to Israel – otherwise how could I make peace with you? I understand your concern that you will not allow anyone else to defend you, but I'm sitting here prepared to give up our traditional means of defense – to do what you won't do. If I'm giving up the weapons and type of army that will be threatening to you, and I'm committing not to have others use my territory against you. But I cannot let you use our territory against others. We will have to tell the Arab League and Islamic Conference what we've agreed. I don't want the Syrians to tell me that we've entered an alliance with Israel – that we're allowing Israel to use our territory. If that Eastern border were only a 100 or so km, rather than 400 km to the south and 100km. But Israel's border with the east is more than 600km. Part of this border will be a Palestinian-Jordanian border. I specified three arrangements for international forces: (1) monitor and verify my obligations in this agreement; (2) an element of Palestinian national defense; and (3) that these forces can have bilateral coordination with you. What I mean is that instead of having zones and locations for an emergency, they may have stations, such as in Egypt, whose peace treaty restricts the hell out of what it can do. The AWACS that will go over our skies – over my town Jericho – they can relay immediately to

Israeli stations and inform you. But with my dignity maintained. Secondly, there will be the Palestinian relations with these forces – which will be paramount since they're on our soil (and the defense of Israel is in Israel's hands). The third element – in the region, Egypt has annual maneuvers with the Americans, as do the Jordanians. Those are the countries that border us. Let's see if we can create a system involving these two countries and us for the benefit of regional security. It can involve smuggling or imminent attacks. With this, we can alleviate ourselves of the strategic question – that we can't be allies against Arabs or be allies against you. That's as far as we can go. We are willing to say that our territory will be void of any international troops – aside from what's in the agreement – and our skies will be void of any international presence, aside from what's agreed.

These forces can undertake that within the borders of Palestine, this buffer will be handled by those forces with teeth. If we agree on a timetable for your withdrawal, Israeli forces will be subject to a gradual withdrawal, which will be phased and replaced.

As far as the two issues that MD did not mention – 1 is the international border between us and Egypt/Jordan and with us and you. The first we want to manage to deal with the issue of movement of goods, etc. For the second, that's our right – and what can happen? Am I going to be able to build bunkers that will be unnoticed by you. With these international forces that I have discussed, there will be an economic development regime. They can do things, you can't.

Reason must guide us now. We did not come here to say that Palestine should be a nation like Egypt, Jordan, Syria. We're different. I think our exercise here will show our ability, both of us, to produce an agreement or not.

IH: Thank you.

GS: Thank you. First of all, I really thank you both for your presentations and comments. It seems to me that we have much more agreements and understandings than may meet the eye right now. I'm sure that we can reach a convergence on numerous matters within the issues and between the issues, even in the order that you mentioned. We have no hidden agendas, and there is really no need for suspicion in some items that you think that we have something hidden by our backs. It is not in our interests. There is a very clear interest that lies in the basis of all what we do here and this is once you establish your statehood it should be as capable as possible to cooperate both with your neighbors in all directions and to maintain your dignity, and there is no intention of harming this dignity. However, we also cannot, as you put it, Saeb, we Israelis cannot change our skin. The fact of the matter is that since the inception of Israel as the Jewish State we were not really wanted or welcomed here, and in this region, as you said, many things could change, but it takes time. We are trying to structure an agreement here for generations that go far beyond the life cycles of each one of

us. In that respect only, I cannot say that we can take risks in what may be real threats to our national security. You know very well that we take a lot of risks in this process – as you do – this is what agreements are all about between former enemies, former hostile populations. But let's face it – hostility is still here, still present. In spite of that, I think we can still reach the basis for the main procedural way for phased withdrawal. I believe we can reach agreement. I think that we all appreciate your combating the anti-peace process groups; I don't think you can draw any real conclusions from our agreement with Egypt – from which Saeb took the MFO and MD took the non-detailing of certain items addressed here. There is a contradiction in the analogy. With Egypt we had a border dispute. While we have a dispute – or conflict – which covers all the aspects of life. We are so deeply integrated, each one in the life of the other – the depth and the width of the conflict is completely different. Borders or security are just one element of this conflict. So what we should endeavor is to create a new reality here, on the basis of the net concerns and not suspicions or a distorted angle of looking at this reality. Because we all have fears. When you face a new reality you don't know what lies behind it. If it succeeds, then fine. If it does not, do we have the tools to correct our mistakes. This is why you should be responsive to our concerns, as we are trying to be responsive to your concerns. If – I agree that symbolism and definitions and expressions are important in order to preserve dignity. But they also tend – it's just a matter of time until such symbols become reality. Just a small example before I get back to the main course of my presentation. When you say demilitarized, you know what it means, if you ask any of us, we will all give more or less the same answer. But if you ask each one of us what is a limited arms state, you will get six different answers. And if we six are not here, you'll get 600 different answers.

SE: You need only to look at the agreement.

GS: Whatever we agree to agree is fine. For example, MD says you'll be asking for US troops to save your lives. I can't imagine for us to be against it. This is why everything is conditioned in this kind of scheme on consent. So in that respect, I'm willing to walk toward you as much as possible. If you wish, for example, to have certain units of police whom you send somewhere – Sierra Leone, Mauritania, whatever – I won't object to it. But if you're sending them somewhere in order to establish an army, this should be prohibited. I'm trying to recap whatever Mohammad presented as comments to our presentation of yesterday, I think I can agree to a lot of it. Starting with the search for mutual interests – and not for one moment looking at Palestinians as servants. This doesn't even come to my mind, really. I think that the preamble, with slight changes here and there, we can complete it even immediately. I think that in committing ourselves to fight terrorism, there's no question of it. And the strategic obligation of both parties is irrespective of any political changes in Israel or in Palestine. I think that we both agree without going too deep into the definitions that the Palestinian state will not possess any military capacities to attack Israel or to join others in threatening Israel. Many of the air force

capacities mentioned by Mohammad could be civil capacities that could be easily agreed: transportation and the Chairman's travel from one place to another and confronting terrorism or disorder can easily be put in the civil aviation caption. I think that we can agree on the armaments of the security force, but I would like that to be done with the participation of Shlomo Yanai. We do agree with what you said, Mohammad, about the nature of these forces, which will be to defend the Pal. state internally. And that the composition, the structure, the numbers, will reflect the nature of the Pal. state as we both see it, at this point in time. We also fully agree to the notion of arms being held only by the security forces, and not by any other element – be it political or any other kind of faction or unit or individuals. I'm willing also to explore the active international force, its composition and the modalities of its operation, in coincidence – or in simultaneous pace with the withdrawal of Israeli forces. This is something that needs further elaboration, but the concept is not rejected. Maybe it could be part of the time international forces and Israeli forces working in parallel during a transitional period. We have to talk about it – I'm not rejecting the idea of an international force that will ultimately replace the Israeli presence. If you do agree that the Pal forces outside Pal shall not be engaged in any activities against our security, this, I think, has nothing to do with your Arab League obligations, which we understand it doesn't make any sense to ask you to turn your back to. But there is a spectrum of activities that we should agree upon, which, wherever it touches the security of Israel, should be prohibited. As you know, we also have some obligations, alliances, assistance treaties, and stuff like that, so we understand your position, and I think we can accommodate it without going too far with requirements from you as a political entity.

Speaking about the manufacture of arms, and their repairs, etc., I think we can find common ground here also, if we concentrate on whichever arms or ammunition are prohibited by the agreement.

About the early warning stations, I think that this is a very easy one. The number we will agree on – I think that we can agree on three. All of the technicality of protecting the personnel, and the movements in and out, this could be worked out – no problem – within the security annex of the FAPS. One question that you've asked Mohammad is for how long do we need them. It's not the first time I've been asked this, but my response is that we need them until further notice – until there is a major, substantive change in Israel's strategic concept that comes as a result of major changes in the threats to Israel's security. And I must admit that we need them. The concept of deployment in emergency situations as you have put it Saeb, when you said, with God's help we won't need them, which is exactly our approach. You can count on one hand's finger the number of times we've mobilized our reserve army and deployed somewhere. Even if we mobilize the army or part of it, still it doesn't mean that we deploy. It is your sovereign territory. It has some limitations, because, in such cases of emergency, which we'll agree because the definition will be so clear that there will be no conflicting interpretation so the situation. Honestly speaking and in good faith, we don't

have an intention of violating the agreement or staying there to hold the territory as under our so-called sovereignty. It's yours, and it's only in rare, rare cases of real emergency, not from the pal territory, but from outside. I think that your rights will be fully respected in that context. I suggest once again that the issue of how to deal with your rights vs. our concerns be dealt with by Yanai and Mohammad.

IH: I think the translation needs to be clearer to Mohammad: how to balance your rights and our concerns. (in Arabic)

SE: That's what I said.

GS: You can rest assured that we have no hidden agenda here, and we can pray to God that we won't need this. For the settlements and the removal of the settlers, we have to work out a plan for that. I'm talking about the settlers who will remain, according to a temporary timeline, still encircled by Palestinian territory. So all the questions of security that relate to this issue should be worked out carefully. And I appreciate your concern in that respect, and I think that it is a very right approach to try to avoid friction and to assure that this all goes smoothly into the final stage of the resettlement of these settlers in Israel. We both have no objection in exploring the monitoring and verification schemes and mechanisms. This is one issue that I assume will be discussed more expert-wise in the security group, including the selection of the countries or entities who will participate in this. And we have full agreement on the coordination and cooperation in the joint security body. Last but not least are the planning and zoning limitations around the EW stations, and I think that what we do have here is more like a caption – not really substance. We'll find a way to deal with it. I know that it has a lot of suspicions within it, but it is an issue, and we'll have to work out how it works where we have security concerns. We don't want to limit your development processes or the advancement of the Palestinian society in habitation and construction, etc., but we'll have to discuss the security concerns we have in that respect, which are far from being enormous.

I went over most of the points that were mentioned, and I tried to concentrate on the ones where we have a very large area of agreement. What I suggest is that we start with what we agree and identify what we don't agree on. We can summon Shlomo Yanai here and finish security in a written form.

SE: I honestly don't know what else to do. Why do we want international forces? Do you think I just want to have international forces to interfere in our daily lives. I was willing to go all the way with the arrangements with international forces and all else that I've mentioned. I gave all of this from the start to avoid the prospect, strategically speaking – if I am telling the Arabs that they can't set foot in our soil, I can't let Israel do that. And now you say that the Americans are unable to defend us.

GS: Did I say that?

SE: We've come all this way to terminate the idea of emergency redeployment on our soil.

[Discussion.]

IH: We didn't talk about an ongoing presence. Gilad talked about parallel activity with the international forces.

SE: I rested my case on the locations and zones for emergency deployment. How can I accept these conditions, while denying them to our Arab neighbors?

IH: Tell me what bothers you.

[Extended break 3:45pm until 5pm. Kanafa served.]

During informal discussions, the Palestinian side conveyed to the Israeli side the following positions: (1) rejection of the concept of emergency redeployment areas; (2) the replacement of all Israeli forces in Palestine with international forces over a specified time, such as one and a half years; (3) insistence that a time limit be placed on Israeli early warning stations; and (4) that Palestine will control its airspace.]

GS: Even if we time the timetable of the phased withdrawal with the evacuation or resettlement of the settlers, we have to make a general rule that the timeline is different in the Jordan Valley. The timetable there will be meaningfully different. Let me remind you that we've started from maintaining our sovereignty in the Jordan Valley, and we now talk about the 180 degree opposite – Palestinian sovereignty, deferred by the phased withdrawal, about which we have to work out the details.

SE: What's the logic behind this? Solutions must be reasonable. They have to be explained.

GS: I've heard a lot about your development plans, your intentions in the Jordan Valley, and your assessment that the JV is the only land reserve that you have for further developments. And for the refugees who will assert their right of return to Palestine territory. I've conveyed your plans and argumentation to our government, and, as a result, we have waived our request for maintaining the presence of sovereign Israeli power in the Jordan Valley. The case in the regular settlements – the isolated the settlements -- is not the same as in the Jordan Valley. While we're willing to accommodate your needs regarding all civil aspects of your development in the JV, we still have to deter any threatening possibilities from the East. That's what we're doing by maintaining for a certain

period a limited and fixed low-key presence in the Jordan Valley. Our withdrawal from the Valley Jordan and the length of the withdrawal is kind of a reflection of the way things will change in the region, and not necessarily between Palestinians and Israelis, but between other countries from larger circles of hostility against Israel, and for that we require a longer period. As well as the two or three or four years that will be required for the evacuation of the settlements. Basically, it's Palestinian sovereignty, only there is a certain length of time, length of period by which it is deferred. As the external threat dissolves or diminishes, we get out of there. That's the reason of our stay there. It does not contradict the development plans and civil planning and modernization and rehabilitation plans that you may have there, which we would be glad to assist you with or cooperate on in any way whatsoever. In principle we accept the linkage between the final arrangements for the settlements and the rhythm of withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian territories.

I understand that the airspace issues are problematic. I'm willing to accommodate any interests that address our needs. I understand that you can't let your airspace be used to attack other Arab countries. I'm confident that this could be arranged. I can see the benefit of parallel arrangements in order to minimize interfere with life in each area – re: environment, noise, etc. Please bear in mind that you will be the only sovereign state in the world that will have a specific, particular, privileged air corridor for your needs through Israeli skies.

SE: What do you mean?

GS: All others have to follow the international corridors provided by ICAO regulations, while you will be able to fly through agreed routes and corridors, under a specific agreed, privileged civil aviation treaty, through the skies of Israel – not through the international corridors.

The last point is the civil aviation treaty, to which I believe the grounds should be non-discrimination, non-interference, and fairness in mutual treatment of the respective air carriers, planes in and out of foreign carriers, and management of the air traffic control system.

The last main point that seems to be a source of difference between us is the deployment zones and areas for emergency deployment cases. I don't know what else to say that hasn't been said yet. We have to think about . . . once again, I'm sure that if I put forth a document that contains this article, with details of the circumstances, cases, etc., and the obligation not to act in unnecessary circumstances, this whole article becomes almost fully theoretical.

SE: If it's theoretical, why include it?

GS: I don't want to deploy on your land, if I must, without it being agreed between us. I'm thinking of your idea, Saeb, of combining it somehow with the international

forces. Your problem will not disappear. But we have to think about it. I doubt, though, if it will possibly create a final solution that will make your concerns disappear. What I can promise you is that we'll give it deep thought and have an internal debate about it with the army. This issue is also connected to my first reflection about the Jordan Valley, and the deterrent character that we have for any kind of external threat from the East. It's not against you, it will never be used against Palestinians, it is your land without any restrictions. Just to make sure that we all understand what the size and locations of these areas are.

- MS: I understand that you want to get all of your concerns across, but we cannot tolerate the endless repetition of your positions. I want to address the three areas: (1) after the evacuation of settlers, and the time required for it, we cannot accept the continuation of Israeli physical military presence in the Jordan Valley – I don't want to hear nice words about development, and then be prevented from actually doing what I need to do. You tell me that when the threats subside, you'll withdraw. I don't see these threats, but we have serious threats from you. You're threatening the neighbors, you're continuing your occupation and subjugation of us. After you withdraw your settlers, you have to withdraw your forces. (2) Regarding the Israeli air force, do whatever you want in your territory, but I don't want the IAF to use our skies. I don't want you to take out of context what we said about others not being allowed to use our skies. I can't give any special privileges to the IAF to our skies – it's not about the environment, it's about whether you're going to have a State that's respectable. The civil aviation arrangements will define all of this. I beg you, Gilad, I came a long way today not to hear you repeat the same things. I would be a fool, an ass, if I accept not to hear from you on these three issues. I took the initiative, and was willing to take the responsibility for concluding an agreement, but with this response, you compel me to go elsewhere.
- GS: What do you want to do? Do you want me to tell you that if you don't do what we want, the negotiations are over? It's the easiest way to get stuck. Maybe you need someone else here to discuss these issues.
- MD: I don't need hours to understand what your position is.
- GS: I cannot accept that our positions have not developed. There are some elements – I told you from the first moment – that are not negotiable, but these are few.
- MD: There is nothing that is not negotiable. How many more years do you want to dominate us?
- GS: When you tell me the Jordan Valley – get out; the airspace – get out, then you're not negotiating.
- MD: You put down 13 points, and we've agreed to most of them. Do you have any of the same arrangements with Jordan or Egypt.

GS: I told you they're not the same. They were border disputes – it was only about land.

[Extended discussion.]

SE: I believe that what Mohammad presented today was intended to create a breakthrough and, when you reflect on it, you'll see that.

Palestine will be a nation of limitations. But what that means is that we will not allow other nations to settle their disputes on our soil. Beneath every point we make, you'll find a central concept: neutrality.

GS: I never reject anything right away. We'll reflect on what you've said. Any package that will come, whether it comes from this table or imposed on us by the Americans or others, will have to deal with all of the problems. What we're both looking for is the balance between all of the issues and the interconnections and internal linkages between one issue and another, one trade-off and another, and producing the best agreement we can reach at this time. For example, I can think of a balance, conditioning between our use of the airspace for security needs and your civil aviation needs. I can think of a balance between your request for swapping lands and our proposal for extending the safe passage to be implemented after the termination of the Interim Period. These are the trade-offs of the issues. But looking at the whole set of agreements we have to reach across all the issues, the main trade-offs are between the issues and not within the issues, meaning that sometimes we will not solve in equilibrium within the issue itself, but we can try to compensate in the neighboring issue. You have moved from your initial positions. We have moved from our initial positions. We are at a time when, if we don't try to put on paper what we agree on, and analyze the differences, so that we very accurately have a vision of the real gaps between us, we'll have to deal with an American document. I don't like the idea, the PM doesn't like it, and I'm sure it's the same for you. Whatever we produce will be 10 times better than what another party does. Let's try to look at the full package of this permanent status agreement, and not look for the trade-offs within the issues, because if you get an independent air terminal in Ben Gurion, you may need to pay for it in another issue. If I want to have control in the EM sphere for my security needs, I may have to compensate you in a completely different issue. I propose that we reflect on what was said today. Below the layer of the superficial non-movement, we have a very large set of understandings. There are some good ideas, we can work out some good solutions. And we have to work out these issues – JV, airspace, and emergency deployment – sometime. We will look at your ideas, but I request that you do the same. I feel that there are a lot of emotions involved in the security issues that shouldn't be here. There are so many suspicions between us built over 30 years, that any new reality may be viewed differently. We didn't come here today with the expectation that we would agree to everything. But I've identified a lot of agreements – and not only

in our favor. And the interpretation that we seize whatever seems favorable to Israel is the wrong way of looking at what we're doing here. I'm willing to try to put on paper something significantly different from our current written text that goes along the lines of certain things that were said today and certain tacit understandings said today – and show it to you tomorrow. Because the alternative is that we will all get screwed up by the American text. And there's no assurance to the contrary. We've seen the US documents before, you've rejected them, and we've rejected them – quite bluntly. No one knows what the sensitivities and problems are better than us. If we don't identify the divergences in every issue of the main core issues, we cannot move forward, because we can't frame the trade-offs that the leaders will have to make at the end of the process.

IH: Would you like to think on this for 5-10 minutes.

MD: No.

IH: Write down your position and we'll write down ours. You'll see: you have gotten everything you're asking for.

[Discussion]

GS: I'm willing to get together tonight.

SE: Let's meet tomorrow.

[Discussion]

MD: I don't want write down a single word until we resolve these issues.

The two sides agreed that they will discuss territorial issues next. They agreed to meet at the following dates, times and places:

Tuesday, 3pm to 6pm (King David)

Wednesday, 12pm to 7pm with a one hour break, 3pm-4pm (King David)

Thursday, 6pm to midnight (Intercontinental, Jericho)

Friday, 1pm to 5pm (Intercontinental, Jericho)

Saturday, 6pm-midnight (King David)